La détention dans les opérations de paix - approche pratique: Jérôme Cario

La détention dans les opérations de paix / approche pratique

Lieutenant-colonel Jérôme CARIO
Chef du bureau etudes / Conseiller juridique
Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces France

« … De plus en plus, nos armées interviennent dans des situations complexes, où parfois le droit positif n’apporte pas toutes les réponses. L’éthique et la déontologie militaire deviennent alors le fondement de leurs décisions. (…) L’éthique du militaire se nourrit de sa culture, d’abord, de son expérience aussi. On touche ici au cœur de la formation des armées. Elle se doit d’enseigner les règles de conduite à tous. Elle a parallèlement la responsabilité de forger des consciences individuelles fortes. (…) Au delà des acquis(…), la réaction personnelle de chacun face à l’événement relève de l’éthique militaire. (…) L’armée ne transige pas avec ses valeurs, son éthique n’est pas à géométrie variable, mais bien la pierre angulaire de la conscience du soldat, et de son action. »
Mme Michèle Alliot-Marie, ancien ministre de la Défense.

Introduction

Si les Conventions de Genève de 1949 sont le noyau contemporain du droit international humanitaire qui place le respect de la personne au centre de notre système de valeurs, la prise en compte des prisonniers de guerre, des personnes capturées, est bien plus ancienne. La guerre inhumaine et odieuse
appartient à tous les temps ; depuis que l’homme existe, la guerre existe et depuis que la guerre existe,
l’homme cherche à en limiter les conséquences. En effet, il faut relever très tôt des tentatives suscitées
par un esprit de charité, d’humanité, reconnaissant des limites à la conduite de la guerre.

Le droit des conflits armés a toujours axé ses textes sur la distinction entre combattants et non combattants. Seul le combattant régulier a le droit de se battre et peut être combattu. Le civil ne peut participer au combat. A cette condition, il ne peut faire l’objet d’une attaque.

Capturé, le combattant ne peut être sanctionné pour avoir porté les armes et provoqué la mort d’autrui. Prisonnier de guerre, il sera incarcéré, non pour le punir, mais dans le seul but de l’empêcher de participer encore aux opérations militaires.

La situation est fondamentalement différente pour le civil qui prend « irrégulièrement » part aux combats. Son acte n’est pas justifié. En provoquant la mort d’une personne, il commet une infraction au droit pénal ordinaire, - homicide volontaire, voire meurtre, et peut être condamné de ce fait aux peines les plus lourdes prévues par le Code Pénal. De plus, il ne bénéficiera pas du statut privilégié réservé aux prisonniers « de guerre » mais sera considéré comme un prisonnier de droit commun.

En cas de doute pour le militaire, qui n’est pas un juriste, quant au statut d’un civil pris les armes à la main qui se prétend membre d’un mouvement de résistance ou de guérilla ou rebel, la force armée qui effectue sa capture doit provisoirement traiter l’intéressé comme un prisonnier « de guerre » en attendant qu’un tribunal compétent se prononce sur le statut exact de cette personne.

Quoi qu’il en soit, les normes que se fixe un pays pour le traitement des personnes capturées sont une mesure de sa civilisation et de son humanité qui est ainsi exposée à la vue de tous.

I. Le cadre d’emploi des forces aujourd’hui

Avant tout j’aimerais revenir sur le cadre politico-juridique aujourd’hui d’emploi des forces. En effet les opérations réalisées dans la phase de « stabilisation », dans lesquelles les forces armées sont engagées, s’inscrivent dans une situation de guerre non déclarée au sens juridique du terme. Cependant les résolutions adoptées par le Conseil de sécurité, le sont très souvent sous chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies. C’est-à-dire que ces résolutions autorisent le recours à la force dans le cadre d’une mission coercitive (peace enforcement) ou de reconstruction (peace building).

Ainsi, la force qui se retrouve dans une situation de paix « juridique » avec des périodes de conflits armés et des périodes de paix, soit simultanément, soit en alternance, doit être en mesure d’appliquer des règles simples et adaptées en matière de traitement des personnes capturées, afin d’éviter toute infraction ou exaction à leur égard.



Toujours est-il, qu’elle soit constituée en armée nationale d’un État officiel, en armée régulière d’un gouvernement non reconnu par l’adversaire, ou en un mouvement de résistance, de guérilla, de rebels ou de milices, toute « force armée » doit répondre aux quatre mêmes conditions pour que ses membres soient reconnus comme combattants et donc prisonniers en cas de capture.

De façon générale, quatre conditions doivent être impérativement respectées par toute force armée qui veut que ses membres, en cas de capture par l’ennemi, ne puissent être condamnés pour avoir pris les armes :
- appartenir à une organisation militaire ;
- avoir un commandement responsable ;
- respecter les règles du droit des conflits armés ;
- se distinguer de la population civile.





- Appartenir à une organisation militaire
Les unités doivent posséder une structure et une organisation de type militaire. Ceci implique une hiérarchie et une discipline effectives.
La constitution occasionnelle de civils en groupes désordonnés ne peut pas suffire pour reconnaître la qualité de combattants. De la même façon, un civil isolé qui entreprend individuellement des actions de lutte, de sabotage ou de harcèlement de l’ennemi, ne bénéficie pas de cette protection.

- Avoir un commandement responsable
Toute force armée doit être placée sous un commandement responsable des actes de ses subordonnés devant un gouvernement ou une autorité politique : gouvernement provisoire, gouvernement en exil, autorité de mouvement de libération, etc.
Il importe peu que cette autorité soit ou non reconnue officiellement par la partie adverse. L’essentiel est qu’une responsabilité politique et juridique soit assumée pour les actes commis par les membres de la force armée, notamment pour les actes contraires au droit des conflits armés et plus précisément dans les limitations des méthodes et moyens de combat.

- Respecter les règles et coutumes de la guerre
Ce commandement militaire doit faire respecter par ses troupes les principes du droit des conflits armés. Une violation occasionnelle d’un de ces principes par un ou plusieurs combattants ne suffit pas à faire présumer que le mouvement s’est soustrait à son obligation générale. Tel serait le cas si un crime de guerre est commis isolément par un membre d’un mouvement de résistance organisé. Un seul manquement commis à l’occasion d’un grand nombre d’opérations militaires et pendant une longue période ne permet pas de refuser à l’ensemble des membres de ce mouvement le statut de combattant.
Il faut ici souligner que le combattant, auteur d’une infraction au droit de la guerre, conserve malgré tout son statut de prisonnier s’il est capturé. Il sera bien sûr poursuivi et condamné pour le crime de guerre commis. Certains Etats ont à ce sujet une conception plus restrictive.
En effet, dès la ratification des conventions de Genève, différents pays ont fait savoir que le combattant, même régulier, qui commet un crime de guerre ne bénéficiera pas du régime privilégié reconnu aux prisonniers durant leur procès et l’exécution de leur peine : droit à la correspondance avec l’extérieur, droit à des colis de secours, droit de déposer des plaintes, intervention du CICR et des puissances protectrices, assistance d’un défenseur, d’interprètes, de témoins… Ces Etats réservent donc au combattant criminel de guerre le régime qu’ils appliquent aux condamnés à une peine de droit commun.

- Se distinguer de la population civile
Il est enjoint aux membres des forces armées, régulières ou non, de se distinguer aussi clairement que possible de la population civile. C’est en pratique, le port de l’uniforme pour les forces armées «classiques », ou un signe distinctif fixe et reconnaissable à distance pour les mouvements de résistance ou de libération organisés.
Le port d’un signe distinctif ou d’un uniforme ne peut pas toujours être permanent, par exemple, en territoire occupé. Néanmoins, les combattants sont tenus de se distinguer de la population civile lorsqu’ils prennent part à une attaque ou à une opération militaire préparatoire à une attaque.
On pense ici à certaines actions de guérilla en territoire occupé, embuscade, sabotage, combat de rue, lutte de maquis... Dans certains cas extrêmes, il y a des situations où, en raison de la nature des hostilités, guérilla urbaine ou sabotage urbain, un combattant armé ne peut se distinguer de la population civile. Dans ces conditions, les combattants doivent porter les armes ouvertement pendant- chaque engagement militaire et le temps où ils sont exposés à la vue de l’adversaire alors qu’ils prennent part à un déploiement militaire préalable au lancement d’une attaque à laquelle ils doivent participer.
D’aucuns affirment que l’arme doit être portée ouvertement au moins à partir du moment où elle est chargée. L’ampleur de cette obligation de se comporter ouvertement en belligérant est à apprécier en fonction des circonstances propres à chaque cas. Le principe général reste la nécessité de ne pas mêler la population civile aux combats. Le non-respect de cette dernière obligation de distinction de la population est malheureusement une méthode souvent utilisée.

Quoi qu’il en soit, le texte du premier protocole traitant des groupes armés n’aboutit en aucune façon à reconnaître le statut de combattant aux auteurs d’actes « terroristes », comme cela a parfois été avancé de façon erronée. La protection reconnue par le premier protocole à certains mouvements de guérilla ou de résistance armée ne trouve à s’appliquer que dans des situations de conflits entre différents Etats ou au sein d’un Etat. La violence de nature terroriste échappe à cette protection.
SIRPA : Côte d’Ivoire
Les acteurs d’actions terroristes s’attaquent par la violence à des personnes civiles étrangères aux mobiles qui les inspirent pour répandre la terreur dans les populations. Ces actions se placent radicalement en marge du droit des conflits armés.

En effet, ce droit des conflits armés, dans son volet jus in bello, interdit de façon absolue, même à titre de représailles, l’attaque sous toutes ses formes des personnes civiles et, en particulier, le recours à la terreur comme méthode de guerre. Le premier protocole est à ce sujet très clair. [1] Pour bénéficier du statut de combattant et donc de prisonnier dès la capture, toutes les personnes qui prennent part à un combat doivent se structurer afin de pouvoir respecter les règles du droit des conflits armés, ce qui n’est en aucune façon le cas des acteurs terroristes qui relèvent pour leurs actes du droit pénal du territoire sur lequel ils ont commis leurs crimes.

II. Des personnes capturées dans les opérations de paix ou missions de stabilisation

Les personnes qui se rendent aux forces armées au cours d’un engagement opérationnel ou durant une action armée deviennent des prisonniers au sens des conventions de Genève. En revanche les personnes « civiles » s’opposant à la mission des forces armées peuvent être « capturées » au cours de l’opération. Ces personnes capturées sont mises en détention ou en rétention, seulement si les règles d’engagement le permettent. La garde, le contrôle et les soins des détenus sont de la responsabilité de l’Etat hôte.

Quand celui-ci est inexistant ou entre des mains malveillantes, la force a une responsabilité de protection de ces individus. Aussi, une classification des personnes capturées doit permettre à la force d’adopter un comportement strictement règlementaire.
Le terme « capturé » couvre plusieurs catégories de personnes. Les prisonniers sont généralement traités d’une manière uniforme et constante, la seule exception réelle étant les besoins d’interrogation. Au contraire, les personnes capturées peuvent être traitées de manière différente selon le motif de leur arrestation. La nécessité de traiter certaines personnes capturées différemment n’autorise pas à appliquer des normes différentes. Que la personne soit gardée par les forces armées ou remise à la police civile, elle doit, à tout moment, être traitée selon les normes fixées pour les prisonniers dans la IIIème Convention de Genève.

Cinq catégories de prisonniers peuvent être ainsi définies :[2]

- Catégorie 1. Ce sont les belligérants, y compris les civils armés, qui commettent des actes hostiles, démontrent des intentions hostiles ou s’opposent d’une autre manière à l’action des forces amies dans la conduite des opérations.
- Catégorie 2. Ce sont les belligérants ou les non-belligérants soupçonnés d’avoir commis des crimes de guerre, des crimes contre l’humanité ou d’autres violations graves du droit humanitaire et des droits de l’homme.
- Catégorie 3. Ce sont les non belligérants qui commettent une agression contre un membre quelconque des forces amies, qui tentent de voler ou de piller des biens protégés ou des biens des forces amies, ou qui commettent des infractions graves définies par le commandant de la force.
- Catégorie 4. Ce sont les non belligérants qui s’introduisent ou tentent de s’introduire sans autorisation dans une zone contrôlée par les forces amies, ou qui s’opposent à la progression des forces amies par des manifestations, des émeutes ou d’autres moyens hostiles.
- Catégorie 5. Ce sont les non-belligérants retenus pour des raisons de sécurité sans être soupçonnés d’activités criminelles.

III. - La responsabilité du commandement à l’égard des personnes capturées

Si l’on doit être conscient que la « judiciarisation » des opérations est un fait, il ne faut pas perdre de vue le cadre de l’action. Cette donnée doit naturellement être prise en compte par le militaire dans les phases de planification et de conduite des opérations. Même si nos situations de conflits armés ne sont pas des guerres, ni en droit, ni en intensité, il faut préciser que les savoir-faire et savoir-être du militaire sont pour une large part toujours identiques, inspirés du droit international humanitaire, du respect des personnes et en particulier de l’application de la IIIème convention de Genève, individuellement et collectivement. Simplement, les contextes dans lesquels les soldats français sont aujourd’hui impliqués sont complexes, où notamment l’ennemi d’un jour est celui avec qui l’on coopère le lendemain.
Cela implique plus d’exigence sur ce que nous devons être capables de mettre en œuvre, exigence d’abord envers nous-mêmes, chacun à notre place, exigence également de nos chefs (clarté des ordres, recul nécessaire) et exigences envers nos subordonnés (compréhension, application, exécution).
C’est-à-dire :
- maîtriser la force, cela a toujours été la marque d’un vrai soldat et surtout ne pas se laisser emporter par la haine et la violence ;
- savoir soigner, capturer, endurer, ravitailler, respecter son adversaire ;
- commander : c’est aussi gérer ses subordonnés après un "accrochage" ;
- soutenir le moral d’un subordonné ;
- rassurer la population ;
- gérer les tensions.

C’est la part de responsabilité du chef militaire sur le terrain qui conduit l’action, de décliner, d’inculquer aux hommes et de faire appliquer chaque fois de façon particulière ces principes fondamentaux, malgré toutes les difficultés liées aux situations toujours complexes et d’une extrême diversité. Une chose cependant demeure : le chef en opérations, quel que soit son niveau, doit décider, souvent dans l’urgence. Cela comporte évidemment des risques, mais représente également la grandeur du métier, qui est davantage qu’un métier.

Les actions menées doivent être légalement irréprochables : libération, interrogation, détention, sont conduites de façon militaire, certes, mais doivent posséder une base juridique irréfutable et connue.
Détention, internement ne sont pas synonymes, « personnes capturées » et « prisonniers de guerre » non plus. En revanche, une fois encore, cela ne change concrètement rien à leur traitement par un militaire français. Ce choix nécessaire et cette coopération avec le droit national et le droit international humanitaire donnent assurément la « force morale » immédiate au décideur sur le terrain, qui se sent encore plus légitime. Il n’en est que plus serein pour poursuivre l’action de combat ou celle plus prosaïque du traitement des personnes capturées. Il faut aussi enquêter pour déterminer l’historique des événements, savoir qui a fait quoi, avant de discriminer. Dans l’action de discrimination, il y a un choix, donc une responsabilité : pourquoi libérer tel détenu et livrer tel autre ?

Qui garantit que la population ne va pas retrouver dans un mois telle personne « libérée » et la massacrer ? Qui dit que la force ne livre pas un pauvre « bougre » à la probablement très « dure » justice gouvernementale...?

Et pourtant, c’est bien le chef militaire qui prend au final de telles décisions. Avec, sa conscience, sa culture et ses règles militaires, il « dit » le droit, il « est » le droit ou dit autrement « le droit ne dit pas tout ». C’est bien en cela qu’il est d’ailleurs « l’ambassadeur de valeurs », humanistes en l’occurrence. Il s’agit, sur un plan moral, de choisir entre le « bien absolu, la règle absolue », choix théoriquement idéal, et la volonté de « tendre vers le bien ». C’est bien la réalité du chef sur le terrain.

- Traitement de la personne capturée ou du prisonnier

Si le facteur « prisonnier » doit être pris en considération par tous les échelons de commandement dans tous les aspects du processus de la planification opérationnelle, c’est dans la conduite que le commandement porte une très grande responsabilité. En effet, il est de son devoir de respecter et faire respecter les règles de droit dans les opérations. Pour répondre à cette exigence, il doit connaître ses exactes responsabilités à l’égard des personnes capturées ou des prisonniers et de leur gestion.

Les principales responsabilités du commandant à l’égard des personnes capturées sont les suivantes[3] :
- Chaque membre de la force doit se conformer aux dispositions des Conventions de Genève (CG) et du premier Protocole additionnel (GPI) ;
- les prisonniers et les détenus éventuels capturés par la force doivent être traités en conformité avec le droit international humanitaire et en application des limitations des règles opérationnelles d’engagement (ROE) ;
- une organisation de traitement des prisonniers doit être en place dans la formation, avec un équipement et une capacité correspondant au nombre prévu ou prévisible de prisonniers ;
- les prisonniers doivent être évacués au plus tôt de la zone des combats sans être exposés au danger pendant l’attente de leur évacuation.

Bien que le commandant porte la responsabilité globale du traitement des prisonniers, il doit organiser cette responsabilité de certains aspects du processus avec ses subordonnés. Ce principe s’applique à tous les niveaux.[4]


Conclusion

Aujourd’hui, on peut se demander ce qu’il reste de pertinence aux règles relatives aux prisonniers. En effet, ces règles n’existent que parce que le combattant accepte le risque de se faire tuer. Et ce risque est réel car le combattant se doit de se distinguer des civils. Il ne lui suffit pas de se dire combattant, il doit visiblement être combattant. C’est ce que prévoient en tout cas les règles de la IIIème Convention.
Même si l’évolution des conflits a influencé l’évolution des règles, il n’en demeure pas moins que cette visibilité doit être effective au minimum durant chaque engagement militaire et durant la période qui précède le lancement de l’attaque.
Cette exigence est l’une des conditions qui permettent de bénéficier du statut de prisonnier. L’autre condition, essentielle et préalable, est que le conflit armé soit international. Ces deux exigences limitent beaucoup les possibilités d’application de la IIIème Convention. En effet, la majeure partie des conflits actuels prend la forme de conflits internes, c’est-à-dire de conflits qui se déroulent sur le territoire d’un seul État et qui opposent les forces armées régulières et des groupes armés dissidents ou des groupes armés entre eux. Pour ces conflits, les États n’ont évidemment pas souhaité être obligés de respecter un statut protecteur pour des individus qui ont pris les armes contre les forces régulières et qu’ils considèrent comme des criminels.
Dans les conflits armés non internationaux, les personnes détenues restent cependant sous l’empire de ce qu’on appelle l’article 3 commun aux quatre Conventions de Genève et au second protocole additionnel aux Conventions de Genève.
Cette « convention en miniature » reprend des garanties minimales sur le traitement des personnes détenues. Même dans les rares cas de conflits internationaux, de nombreux refus d’application minent la force de la IIIème Convention. On invoque la notion de « terroriste », de « combattants illégaux », pour refuser le bénéfice de ce statut protecteur. Mais c’est ignorer les règles même de la IIIème Convention. Si le statut de prisonnier est contesté, les règles s’appliquent cependant jusqu’à ce qu’un tribunal compétent ait statué. Si ce statut leur est par la suite refusé par ce tribunal, ces personnes ne tombent alors pas dans une zone de non-droit mais reviennent sous la protection de la IVème Convention, relative aux populations civiles.

Il est donc essentiel de réaffirmer l’applicabilité des règles et d’en faire une interprétation exacte. Il est également permis de s’interroger sur le devenir de ces règles face aux nouvelles formes de conflits mais, à ce jour, rien n’indique que le système juridique actuel (les Conventions de Genève et les législations nationales et internationales) ne permet pas de faire face aux situations même les plus complexes.

Et si la Force ne peut pas remettre les individus appréhendés aux autorités judiciaires locales, il faut impérativement qu’un « tribunal compétent », reconnu et accepté à la fois par les Etats composant la Force multinationale et par l’Etat hôte, puisse être mis en place. Il s’agit là d’une responsabilité politique que le commandement militaire doit impérativement obtenir, soit au niveau international soit au niveau national.
Enfin ce n’est que par une connaissance précise de ces règles à l’égard des personnes capturées et une volonté politico-militaire de les faire appliquer que l’on évitera crimes et homicides.


« … Ceux qui pourraient penser que le droit des conflits armés
serait de l'ordre du discours, quand l'action, elle, s'inscrirait
dans des réalités concrètes d'inspiration bien différentes se
trompent dramatiquement et font fausse route. »
Général d’armée Bruno CUCHE, ancien CEMAT



[1] On observe que les guerriers non-conventionnels s'autorisent tout ce qui est, justement et formellement, prévu et interdit par les conventions relatives à la conduite des hostilités dans les conflits armés (jus in bello).
Ainsi le droit des conflits armés a prévu la quasi-totalité des actes de guerre que ces acteurs de violence font subir à leurs victimes :
- obligation d'éloigner les objectifs militaires des zones peuplées (Convention de Genève III, (G III)) ;
- attaques interdites des biens civils (article 52 du GP I) ;
- attaques directes interdites des personnes civiles (articles 48 et 51 GPI) ;
- utilisation interdite de non-combattants pour protéger des objectifs militaires ;
- attaques indiscriminées interdites (articles 51 § 4 et 5 GP I) ;
- attaques interdites des localités non défendues (article 59 §1 GPI) ;
- attaques interdites des zones neutres, démilitarisées et/ou sanitaires (articles 14 et 15 de la Convention
de Genève IV et 23 de Genève I ; (GIV et GI) ;
- attaque interdite des biens indispensables à la survie de la population civile, des biens culturels, des
lieux de culte (articles 53 et 54 GP I) ;
- atteintes interdites à l'environnement naturel (article 55 GP I) ;
- enrôlements interdits des enfants (articles 53 §1 GI) ;
- attaques interdites des ouvrages d'art contenant des forces dangereuses (article 56 GPI)

[2] Catégories énumérées dans le manuel de doctrine interarmées de la Défense Nationale Canadienne. Traitement des prisonniers de guerre et des détenus. Interrogations et interpellations au cours des opérations internationales / J7 doc4/du 01/08/2004.
[3] Cf Annexe N°1
[4] Cf Annexe N°2

Opening Presentation by Professor Michel Veuthey

Michel Veuthey's Opening Presentation

1st Plenary Session, September 4th
As the President of the ICRC highlighted this morning, the question of the applicability of international humanitarian law is of fundamental importance. This will be the object of this first panel which will be divided into two sessions. The first will focus on the concept of peace operations at the operational level rather than the legal level. The second session will focus on the applicability of international humanitarian law to peace operations. This, as we will see, remains a topic open for debate.

The first speaker in this initial section will be Madame Corinna Kuhl, Chief of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the United Nations, who will speak on “The evolution of peace operations, from interposition to integrated missions”. Following Mrs. Kuhl’s presentation will be loyal friend of the Institute, Professor Louis Balmond from the University of Nice who will present to us “The legal framework of peace operations, from Chapter VI to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter”. To conclude this first section, there will be forty minutes to respond to questions.

As regards the question time, I’d like to draw your attention to the forms you have each received in your folios which are for submitting written questions. If you would like to ask questions of the speakers, please fill these forms out and hand them to one of the Institute’s representatives who are present in the room. The speakers will give priority to written questions and then will give the floor to oral questions if time permits.

In the second section we will hear three speakers. Dr. Daphna Shraga, Senior Legal Advisor of the Office of Legal Affairs at the General Secretariat of the United Nations will speak on “The legal framework of peace operations, from Chapter VI to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.” Following Dr. Shraga’s presentation will be Professor Marco Sassoli from the University of Geneva, speaking on “International humanitarian law in peace operations, material scope of application”. The final speaker in this second section will be M. Gert-Jan Van Hegelsom, Legal advisor to the Council of the European Union. M. Van Hegelsom will speak on the subject of “International humanitarian law and operations conducted by the European Union”.

Following these speakers, we will have one hour to respond to your questions.

Before giving the floor to these notable speakers, many of whom I call friends, allow me to add a few personal words.

Three different approaches may be taken when considering the applicability of international humanitarian law in peacekeeping operations. I believe these approaches should be complementary and, indeed, may serve to strengthen each other: a legal approach, a military approach and an ethical approach.
The first approach, being the legal approach, will be the principle, although hopefully not exclusive, focus of our discussions. This approach is based principally on conventional and customary international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, we must not forget the importance of the various human rights instruments, both universal and regional, nor the domestic laws of the peacekeepers’ countries of origin and of the territory in which they are operating. This question of applicability is not a new one: at least since Korea in 1950 and the operation in the Congo in 1960, this issue has been discussions between the ICRC and the Secretariat of the United Nations. Additionally, while the Bulletin of the Secretary General of August 12, 1999 attempted to answer the question, the debate surrounding the applicability of IHL by the UN is not a settled issue.

The question of the applicability of law is never simple. What type of conflict are we facing? International? Non-international? It often happens that we must ask whether we are dealing with one sole type of conflict, a combination thereof. And often we are confronted with different phases of conflicts or even simultaneous armed conflicts. The next question that must be asked is which rules of humanitarian law, being the Conventions of 1949 of the two Additional Protocols and customary law, are applicable in the material, temporal, territorial or personal scope. Without having the time to go in depth, one particular provision must not escape our attention: Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 as the minimum applicable norms in all circumstances. Article 3 common contains the essential minimum guarantees that to be afforded to those who are not or are no longer taking an active part in hostilities. This provision was recognised in 1986 as reflecting the “elementary considerations of humanity” applicable in all armed conflicts by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case of 1986 and is generally recognized as reflecting customary international law.

In concluding this brief legal introduction, we must not forget that in all circumstances, both in times of peace and times of armed conflict, the minimum guarantees enshrined within Article 3 are also reflected in the non-derogable provisions of Human Rights instruments.

The second approach is military. The military forces in action must have clear rules on the treatment that must be afforded to wounded and captured persons and to civilians. The application of the principles of international humanitarian law is a fundamental aspect of military discipline and must form the base of the rules of engagement (ROE) that are applicable independently of precise legal analysis.
The third and final approach is the ethical approach. Ethics in peacekeeping operations can take several forms and build upon individual and collective morals:
· The first being the military honour of an army or indeed of any military unit;
· The second takes us back to international humanitarian law with the principles enshrined within the Martens Clause which applies “in cases not covered by the law in force” and appeals to the demands of the public conscience.
· The third is that the violation of humanitarian law can ruin the legitimacy of a military unit or an operation as a whole. These violations will be all received even more negatively if they go against the cultural or religious values of the local population.

Allow me to finish this introduction with a quote from Albert Camus for you to consider in relation to the applicability of humanitarian law:

“To fight for a truth without destroying it by the very means used to defend it”

Report of Working Group 3

Report of Working Group Three – Friday September 5th 2008.

Peace Operations and the Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law

Report presented by Professor Fausto Pocar


Thank you.

Working Group Three was composed of myself, Judge Meron who spoke of the role of peacekeepers in searching for persons charged with War Crimes, Ms. Olivia Swaak-Goldman who dealt with cooperation between peace forces and the International Criminal Court, and Prof William Taft who dealt with preventing and reporting violations of international humanitarian law.

The working group came to no final solution on these issues. It was not the task of the session to come to a solution but thanks the excellent and focused presentations there has been an identification of the major issues concerning cooperation with international courts and peacekeeping forces. Attention has been placed on both the achievements and the shortcomings and the limits of the varying and multi-faceted normative framework defined by ad hoc Security Council resolutions, fundamental international law principles and various forms of agreements. Also discussed was the influence of major political factors which tend to impact on the ability of courts to carry out their mandates, even though at times, as in the case of the self-referral of the Congo to the ICC, they may play in favour of courts as well.

A preliminary consideration that was made during the Working Group is that international courts lack their own police; they have jurisdiction over crimes but do not have enforcement jurisdiction. The contributions highlighted how, in addition to the non-replaceable cooperation of states, this limitation can at least in part, though with varying degrees of effective cooperation from one court to another, be remedied by the role of peacekeepers to a certain extent. But in general this will depend first and foremost on the content of the mandate of peacekeeping forces. I will not make a summary of the three presentations that were made but will rather discuss some of the points that have been made.

First, the lack of enforcement jurisdiction of international criminal courts distinguishes these courts, starting with the ICTY in 1993, from the previous experience of Nuremberg and Tokyo where the tribunals acted in a situation of occupation and had a sort of enforcement jurisdiction where they had the possibility of ordering the arrest of individuals and to collect evidence and so on. The situation is different for current court except, perhaps, for the Kosovo panels which are by definition and by their mandate assisted by UNMIC police and also, perhaps, for the East Timor situation.

Now one question: why is it so difficult to arrest people? Normally it has been said that there is vagueness in the mandate of armed forces in that respect. It was stressed that in the beginning even the ICTY received very little cooperation from States and that was quite detrimental, but also from security forces starting with UNPROFOR. Things only started to change at the end of the nineties but the general practice seemed to be for peacekeeping forces: “we arrest people for whom tribunals have sent an arrest warrant only if we meet them or if we by chance come across them.”

Nevertheless it has been stressed that the achievement of arresting people by the ICTY shows a very good record and it is largely satisfactory: out of 161 accused, only two remain at large. These people are at a certain level but nevertheless in terms of numbers the achievement is important. On the other hand the incorporation of peacekeeping forces of arresting accused in other situations has also been important. It is enough to think of the arrest of the former Liberian president, Charles Taylor.

The problem is somewhat different for the ICC and most of the debate focused on the cooperation with the ICC. The ICC itself of course has no international enforcement agency and the role of peacekeepers has been stressed as being very important. Also because the ICC normally has to investigate in the middle of ongoing conflicts and has the problem of ensuring the protection, safety and wellbeing of victims and witnesses during the conflict unlike other tribunals that act after the conflict has concluded. So there is a need to rely on peacekeeping operations and the need to enter into specific agreements with international organisations to facilitate that cooperation.

The agreement between the ICC and the UN was discussed. In particular, in light of that a case study has been made by Ms Swaak-Goldman on the cooperation between the ICC and one of the peacekeeping operations, being MONUC, the operation in Congo. Based on a memorandum of understanding between the ICC and MONUC it has been stressed that although the Security Council authorized MONUC to cooperate with efforts to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice this does not necessarily include enforcement powers in this respect.

Under the memorandum of understanding, MONUC may agree to a request by the Democratic Republic of Congo Government in carrying out the arrest of the persons sought by the court. MONUC may assist the ICC in search and seizure operations, security, crime scenes, transportation of suspects security support – there is certain flexibility on a case-by-case basis. But the enforcement powers of MONUC are made available more at the request of the government of Congo than at the request of the ICC itself.

Some challenges for the ICC have also been stressed. The problem of balancing the rights of the accused and the duty of the prosecutor of prompt disclosure of information are issues not addressed specifically by the statute of the ICC itself.

Especially in the third presentation, it was stressed that not everything is international criminal justice and not everything has to be done by international criminal courts. The issue of reporting international humanitarian law violations for the purpose of taking steps different from the prosecution of the individual is also an important feature of the repression of violations of international humanitarian law with a view to also identifying different political situations, like the truth commissions or other means for dealing with a certain situation. And the question of the prevention of human rights violations which tends at times to be underestimated was also discussed at length during the Working Group with the view to identifying how peacekeeping forces can work in that direction.

This connection has also been stressed that there is an important role to be played by domestic jurisdictions: it is their primary responsibility to prevent and to repress violations of international humanitarian law. A number of problems have been raised in this respect including how far peacekeeping forces have the obligations to report or also to intervene to stop abuses if they see abuses being committed or on the point of being committed.

Then the discussion went again to the courts and to the question of the relationship between international and domestic courts: the principle of complementarity. The difficult issue of deciding when a court is unable or unwilling to take a case, in particular whether inability is just a technical inability or if it is a political inability as it appears to be the case in many situations.

I will conclude the report here. As you see there have been many issues discussed. In general the lack of sufficient clarity as to the role of peacekeeping forces in this matter has been stressed, although there have been several examples in which peacekeeping forces have played an important role. But the whole framework is not fully defined and should perhaps be defined in the future.

Thank you.

Transcribed from audio recording by Amy Iberg, IIHL, Genève

Tool or Taboo?: The Relevance of the Law of Occupation to Peace Operations

Dr. Marten Zwanenburg
Legal Adviser Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands

Trasnscript of audio recording from Plenary Session, Friday 5th September

"Tool or Taboo": The Substantial Relevance of the Law of Occupation to Peace Operations

Good morning everyone.

I’d like to make a few preliminary remarks before I start my presentation. First of all I’d like to thank the organisers of this Round Table for inviting me to this event. Secondly, I speak in a personal capacity.

The topic of my presentation is the substantial relevance of the law of occupation to peace operations and I have given it the title of “Tool or Taboo”.

I hope at the end of my presentation to be able to tell you whether I think the law of occupation is a tool or a taboo for peace operations.

As I said, the subtitle of my presentation as given to me by the organisers of the Round Table is the “substantial relevance of the law of occupation” and you might already think that this means that I have concluded that the relevance is substantial. That’s not quite the case yet at least, so I perhaps should say I’ll be talking about the substantive relevance of the law of occupation. That is, to what extent the law of occupation is relevant to the factual circumstances of peace operations.

So in distinction to the formal application of peace operations therefore I will not touch on that formal applicability. I will talk about situations where the law may be formally applicable, where it may not be and in many cases where it may be controversial.

In the time allotted to me there is no way I can be comprehensive. So I won’t be talking about a number of things. One of them, as I said, is the formal applicability of the law of occupation to peace operations. Another will be the relationship between the law of occupation and human rights, as interesting as it is. And a third one that I will touch on a little bit but not comprehensively is the relationship between Security Council Resolutions and the law of occupation.

First I will say a little bit about what I understand by peace operations. Then I will give a very brief introduction to the law of occupation and then I’ll move to the substantive relevance and will finish with a conclusion.

Now, if you talk about peace operations you should know what you mean precisely by peace operations. the difficulty with peace operations is that there are many terms that are used – peace operations, peace-support operations, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement—and I could go on for half an hour more.

But there are very few clear definitions and the reason is that peace operations is something that has developed in a very ad hoc way, as we heard yesterday by the United Nations, and therefore there are no clear, hard and fast legal definitions. The definition that I will use is the definition used by NATO for peace support operations which you can see up on the screen.

And the central element of that definition is the word impartially which, at least for NATO, distinguishes between ‘peace support operations’ and ‘war-fighting operations’. And I should say at the outset that it is very difficult to make the distinction between one and the other in certain situations. I should also say that this definition of peace operations is still quite comprehensive dealing both with UN commanded operations and UN authorised operations, and even operations that are not authorised by the UN. Think for example of the operation in Albania without UN mandate authorisation but with consent by Albania. And finally about peace operations I should say that I will distinguish between what I call international territorial administrations, which are operations that take over partially or totally the administration and government of the particular territory, and what I will call ‘regular operations.’ Basically just like civilians are all persons who are not combatants, I will use this term of ‘regular operations’ for any operation which fits this definition and is not an international territorial administration.

The key question is: what does the law of occupation have to offer these operations? We heard yesterday that military commanders want clear guidelines about what to do and, more importantly, what not to do on the ground. Can the law of occupation provide clearer guidelines for military commanders? If you look at the law of occupation and its development, the picture doesn’t look too hopeful.

After all the law of occupation is very old and the very definition of the law of occupation has mainly been the same since 2 centuries ago in the Brussels Declaration of 1864. Essentially the definition hasn’t changed much since then. So, at first sight it doesn’t look to hopeful that a law that old could provide useful guidelines for modern situations.

Here is a very brief outline of the law of occupation: As you’ve all heard, the definition of the law of occupation is in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and then, of course, we have the Fourth Geneva Convention which also provides important rules on the law of occupation. Basically the Hague Regulations tried to balance between the interests of the occupier, the local population of the occupied territory and the displaced sovereigns, so there was something of a triangle there, whereas the Fourth Geneva Convention is more interested in the interests of the local population. There’s more of a real balance there between the interests of the occupier and of the occupied population.

And of course another important facet of the law of occupation is that it has both negative and positive obligations. Up on the screen you see perhaps the most important positive obligation which is art 43 of the Hague Regulations.

Art. 43: The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

As I said, I will not try to be comprehensive due to the time limitations so I will just try to cover some of the provisions of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention and see whether they can provide guidelines for peace operations. And of course it’s logical to start with the Hague Regulations and perhaps the main article is Article 43 of those Hague Regulations. Basically it has two elements – a positive obligation for the occupier to do something and the second part is a negative obligation for the occupier to abstain from doing something, namely to change the laws of the occupied territory unless absolutely prevented from doing so.

The first part for regular peace operations will usually be logical in the sense that very often to restore public order will be included in the mandate. My military colleagues like to use the term ‘a safe and secure environment’ and I think that pretty much covers the obligation in art 43. I think that for regular peace operations they will not be interested in changing the laws of the occupied territory so it’s not such a question for them. If we look at international territorial administrations, on the other hand, that is precisely the reverse. It may be difficult for them to abide by the obligation not to change the laws of the occupied territory unless absolutely prevented. And of course there is some leeway provided in the law of occupation as it has developed in doctrine also, in that the occupier can change the laws – it is generally accepted – if that is necessary to respect human rights; la vie publique can be interpreted quite extensively. But there is at some point a cutoff line beyond which an occupying power cannot go and beyond which international territorial administrations sometimes do go and certainly want to go. So on the one hand Article 43 may provide useful guidelines, but it can also provide strictures. This is where UN Security Council resolutions come in because it is my view that the Security Council can set aside the law of occupation. This is precisely where it could do so, in providing that an occupying power or international territorial administration admin can go beyond the obligation to respect the laws in force as much as possible – with one caveat that is that the Security Council should do so clearly and unequivocally, which I know is quite a lot to ask from the SC. But I think that if you send military personnel and arms away in a peace operation, that’s the least you can do for them and I think the Security Council could do better.

Moving on to other provisions in the Hague Regulations, for example Article 48 and Article 49 which deal with things that the government would normally do. These can provide useful guidelines for international territorial administrations which could help in developing regulations and instructions by international territorial administrations. I also think that when it comes to property – and of course the law of occupation generally makes a distinction between private property and property of the state whereby private property has a higher level of protection than property of the state – I think that when it comes to the taking and using of property that there the law of occupation has very useful guidelines for military commanders. You could think of situations in which they could be useful to use land by a peace operation for building of a compound which usually will not be res nullius but will be somebody’s land. You could also think of seizing weapons at a checkpoint –a particular weapon that you seize and perhaps destroy will be someone’s property. And there I think that the laws of occupation and the Hague Regulations have useful provisions that could provide guidance. I’m thinking of Articles 47, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56.

In closing on that particular aspect I think that it’s very important for the legitimacy – and I think legitimacy is a key aspect of peace operations – to be seen to be dealing responsibly with property. So therefore I think it’s very helpful that the law of occupation has some guidelines to provide there.

Moving on to the Fourth Geneva Convention. As I said, the Fourth Geneva Convention deals to a large extent with the interests of the occupied population. And a large part of that part of Fourth Geneva Convention deals with the physical protection of the local population, in particular Part Three Section One which deals with the status and treatment of protected persons. And also there are very useful guidelines to be taken from the law of occupation. Think for example of article 27, art 31 and Art 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

I’d just like to note that particularly in modern peace operations, which are comprehensive peace operations, and have many functions. Think of MINURC for example, which also has quite a large number of personnel, they interact with the local population on a daily basis so it’s very important for military commanders to have guidelines on how to deal with that local population and all the different functions that a peace operation operates in.

I should note, however, that a number of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that deal with the protection of individuals are quite generally formulated and that also there are some ‘escape clauses’ if you will. Think for example Art 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which allows rights of communication to be limited and also Article 27. I think that here we run up to the interaction between human rights and international humanitarian law. And I always warn people who are very adamant in wanting to apply the law of occupation to peace operations that this also opens the argument to other people to say that the law of occupation applies as the lex specialis and that therefore human rights no longer apply. And of course we all know that the law of human rights as the law of peacetime provides much more guarantees than the law of occupation.

A very important part of dealing with individuals is detention in modern peace operations. We will have a presentation on the Copenhagen Process later on today which is an indication of how important detention and the potential lack of clarity on the rules of detention are for contributing nations in modern pops. And therefore I think it’s also helpful to point out that the law of occupation has something to contribute. Think for example of the Australians in East Timor in ITERFET who were quite engaged in detention, used a number of provisions from the law of occupation. (Whether they thought it was formally applicable or whether they applied it by analogy I will not touch on.) They found that the law of occupation provided useful guidelines, for example in Article 69, in dealing with detainees and how further to deal with them and bring them to justice. But not only that, the law of occupation also provides legal bases for detention. I don’t want to suggest that if the law of occupation doesn’t apply formally a peace operation can rely on those de jure, but we all know that ‘all necessary means’, those three little words, don’t provide much guidance for how to deal with detention in a peace operation. To put flesh on the bones of those three little words I think it’s very useful that the law of occupation has Article 68 and Article 78 and that those can be useful to further develop guidelines for military commanders in peace operations on detention. Linked to that is Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which deals with the transfer of detainees. I’d like to point out that this article has been used by analogy, at least by my own country, in helping to devise an agreement with the Afghan Government in handing over detainees in Afghanistan even though the official position is that there’s no occupation there.

Those provisions I think are very useful, mostly for regular peace operations, but there are also provisions that are more useful for international territorial administrations when it comes to the provision of public services by such operations. One of those is Article 50 the Fourth Geneva Convention but you could also think of article 55 and 56. In international territorial administrations the provision of such services is often part of a mandate. The operation takes over the Government of the country and therefore also the provision of public services.

This raises a number of questions to do with the mandate of the operation. The first one is what if the mandate is more limited than the law of occupation would require. If, in a particular case, it’s controversial whether the law of occupation applies should this lead to a broadening of the mandate or will it lead to a mission (…) whereby the local population expects the commander to do something that is not really allowed by the mandate but to win the hearts and mind he’s going to do it anyway. And I’ve seen that happen in practice quite a number of times.

What if the capabilities of the operation are more limited than what the law of occupation would require? In a number of provisions the law of occupation says the occupying power must do the maximum extent of its abilities, or words to the same effect. But there are also some obligations which are not so limited. And what if simply the operation doesn’t have the personnel? We know that usually the UN Security Council in UN operations puts a personnel cap on peace operations. So what if that personnel cap is too small when we look at obligations from the law of occupation.

And finally, what I find an interesting provision is article 47 of the GCIV which I think requires a lot more study. At first I think it seems to put a lot of limitations on what an international territorial administration can do because often it wants to get local institutions running as soon as possible. At first, this article seems to limit that possibility. But if you look more closely at the text and the background, the object and purpose and the travaux preparetoires of Article 47, you’ll see that what it deals with is not so much that you’re limited with changing things but that you’re limited in changing things that will deprive the local population of rights they have. So perhaps it’s not such a big limitation as it seems at first sight.

And this brings me to my conclusion, or rather conclusions. I think it will be clear by now that I think that the law of occupation is a tool for peace operations – one of the tools that can provide useful guidelines even if the law of occupation is not formally applicable or if its application is controversial. Which provisions will provide useful guidelines depends to a large extent on whether we’re dealing with an international territorial administration or ‘regular’ peace operations. At the same time, we shouldn’t expect too much from the law of occupation because it’s the smallest circle of protection, if you will, and even within the law of occupation there are possibilities for limitations. And so I think it’s very important to look further at how the law of human rights and the law of occupation interact. And then there are a number of important questions which deserve more study such as: if the law of occupation applies, what if the mandate is broader than the law of occupation? There I said that UN Security Council resolutions with the caveat, when they’re clearly formulated can help. And on the other side of the coin when the mandate is broader than occupation and should of course be the other way around.

And finally, a note on accountability. As I said, legitimacy is a central tenant of peacekeeping operations. Accountability is a very important part of that, and there unfortunately the law of occupation doesn’t have too much to offer. We all know that there’s a lack of mechanisms of to deal with potential violations of humanitarian law. Also, there we should have some expectation management of what we should expect from the law of occupation.

Thank you.


Transcribed from the audio by Amy Iberg, IIHL Genève.

Peacekeeping Operations and the International Criminal Court - Presentation by Olivia Swaak-Goldman

Peacekeeping operations and the International Criminal Court[1]
Olivia Swaak-Goldman
Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court


I. Introduction

The achievements of the International Criminal Court in the past ten years have been remarkable. There are now 108 States Parties, the Judges have issued 12 arrest warrants, resulting in 4 individuals in custody. The Office of the Prosecutor has opened investigations in 4 situations: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Darfur in the Sudan, and the Central African Republic. The OTP is also monitoring situations across 3 continents, including Afghanistan, Georgia, Kenya, Cote d’Ivore, Colombia and Chad. However we believe that the next ten years will be even more interesting. The Rome Statute is an innovative legal design modelled to address the threats and challenges of the new century.

In Rome in 1998, participants (including civil society organizations and states with varying legal traditions) debated the creation of the Rome Statute from very different perspectives, but all shared the same sense that their efforts were not just an exercise in putting ideas on paper. They knew that the new legal design would profoundly impact the way international relations are governed. Accountability and the rule of law would be the framework.

Under the Rome Statute, substantive law has been codified into one detailed text. States have reaffirmed their duty to prosecute those accused of the most heinous crimes. An independent, impartial and permanent International Criminal Court has been established; and authority has been vested in the Court to intervene if States fail to carry out their own responsibility to conduct genuine proceedings, while at the same time providing an incentive to States to assert their own responsibilities in the cause of international justice.

The Rome Statute creates a global criminal justice system based on the interaction between States, a permanent International Criminal Court, international organizations and civil society institutions, a system of interaction based on the two key concepts of complementarity and cooperation.

Let me spend just a minute on the issue of cooperation. It is essential to understand that the ability of the ICC to rely on strong and effective forms of cooperation from all of its partners will be critical for the successful execution of its mandate. As the Court’s President, Mr. Philippe Kirsch, has noted, the Court has been established on two pillars: a judicial pillar, represented by the Court itself, and an enforcement pillar, which in turn belongs to the States Parties.

As you know, the Court does not rely on an international enforcement agency to implement its mandate and execute its judicial decisions. Therefore, the Court’s mandate needs to be implemented indirectly by all States Parties, which accepted our mandate and recognized a series of obligations towards international criminal justice.

In this regard, one could say that the enforcement of the Rome Statute is dependant on national support (including through international organizations), for all matters pertaining to, for example, the collection of evidence, the security of witnesses, the conduct of searches and seizures, the execution of arrest warrants, and the surrender of persons. In all of these crucial matters for the enforcement of the Court’s mandate, we rely on the cooperation of States Parties.

One of the most significant aspects of the ICC is that, given the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, we have to investigate in the middle of ongoing conflicts. We have to do so in accordance with Article 68 (1) of the Statute, protecting the safety and well being of victims and witnesses during the investigation. In order to carry out expeditious investigations and prosecutions of massive crimes in this context of violence, we have come to rely on the cooperation and the support of international agencies in the field, and in particular of peacekeeping operations. Given the exponential development of the number and the mandates of these missions all around the world, they have become crucial partners of the Court in some investigations, while respecting their own mandate.

For the rest of my time this afternoon I would first like to discuss the general cooperation framework as established in the Rome Statute and how it applied to the Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the United Nations. Then I would like to discuss the Memorandum of Understanding with MONUC as an example of how peacekeeping operations and the Court can work together, before turning to the challenges facing cooperation. Finally I would like to touch briefly on investigations concerning crimes against peacekeepers.

II. Part IX Cooperation and the ICC-UN Agreement

Part 9 of the ICC Statute establishes the basis for cooperation in that it lays out the obligations of States Parties to cooperate with the Court, while also allowing the Court to invite cooperation from non-State Parties and international organizations. Additionally, under Article 54 of the Statute the Prosecutor can enter into specific agreements with international organizations and others to facilitate cooperation.

The regime for cooperation established under Part 9 touches upon some of the most critical aspects of interaction between the Court and national authorities. What is interesting is that the Rome Statute, which is a treaty arising out of four years of negotiations between States, attempts to arrive at a unique balance between what has often been referred to as the ‘vertical’ regime of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ‘horizontal’ regime of inter-State mutual legal assistance.

One of the clearest places we can see this is in the provision stating that requests for cooperation by the Court are to be executed “in accordance with the relevant procedure under the law of the requested State and, unless prohibited by such law, in the manner specified in the request, including following any procedure outlined therein or permitting persons specified in the request to be present at and assist in the execution process”. This has obviously proved particularly relevant for the Office of the Prosecutor, since the ability of the Prosecutor to control the manner in which evidence is gathered will often prove critical for the effectiveness of the investigation.

Priority areas have been identified in support of our investigations and prosecutions. State Parties have been asked to put in place procedures for the screening of witnesses, especially in refugee communities. States Parties have also been asked to set up emergency procedures for issuing visas for threatened witnesses, and some States have agreed to establish a “hotline” ensuring speedy visa processing.

Other priority areas of cooperation include: public and diplomatic support; arrest and surrender; information regarding the identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items; protection of staff, victims and witnesses and preservation of evidence; facilitating voluntary appearance of witnesses; providing forensic expertise and examination of sites; service of documents and notification; operational support; and identification, tracing and freezing of assets.

For all these forms of cooperation, it is important to highlight that even though States Parties have a general obligation to cooperate with the Court (article 86), intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, are not obliged to do so (article 87.6). However, in many of the situations before the ICC, field missions of international organizations or peacekeeping operations may have unique access to a particular territory.

In order for the Office of the Prosecutor to seek the cooperation of these organizations and missions, as it falls outside of the regime established by Part 9, it needs to enter into a separate agreement. Thus, by voluntarily signing the ICC-UN Relationship Agreement on 4 October 2004, the UN accepted a general “obligation of cooperation and coordination” with the Court (article 3). Part III of the Agreement clearly established the general rules and obligations on cooperation and judicial assistance between the Court and the UN.



III. A case study of cooperation between the ICC and a peacekeeping operation: the MONUC MoU

A year later, on 8 November 2005, these general provisions would help to give shape to the Memorandum of Understanding between the ICC and the UN on cooperation from MONUC, the UN Mission in the DRC.

The experience of the ICTY with the NATO-led peace enforcement operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that the conclusion of such agreements will be particularly important where an international organisation is exercising military or law enforcement powers in the territory subject to the Prosecutor’s investigations.

In the case of MONUC, the mandate of the mission was specifically revised to enable the possibility for ICC cooperation. After lengthy discussions resulting in the deletion of explicit reference to the ICC, the Security Council adopted a provision in Resolution 1565 (2004) which authorises MONUC to “cooperate with efforts to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice, while working closely with the relevant agencies of the United Nations”.

As a result of compromise discussions, however, the provision was excluded from the categories of tasks in respect of which the use of force is permitted. Therefore, it cannot be relied upon for ICC requests that would require the exercise of enforcement powers.

The Memorandum of Understanding between the ICC and the UN on cooperation from MONUC arrived at a creative solution to this restriction by cross referencing other provisions of MONUC’s mandate where use of force is permitted. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1565, for example, authorises MONUC to use all means necessary under a broad heading enabling assistance to the DRC authorities in re-establishing confidence, discouraging violence, and deterring use of force threatening the “political process”, and to enable free movement of UN personnel. Also of relevance, paragraph 5(c) authorises use of force for the disarming of “foreign combatants”.

Moreover, Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003) “authorizes MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deems it within its capabilities, in North and South Kivu”. MONUC has implemented such provisions to assist the DRC authorities in the arrest and detention of combatants and militia leaders located in its areas of deployment. In a similar vein, the MONUC MoU provides that MONUC may agree to a request from the DRC Government in carrying out the arrest of persons sought by the Court in the areas where it is deployed, where this would be consistent with its mandate. Other enforcement powers made available under similar arrangements include MONUC’s preparedness to assist in search and seizure operations, the securing of crimes scenes, the transportation of suspects, security support, and emergency temporary refuge for ICC staff and witnesses.

At the same time, the MoU reserves ample flexibility for MONUC to consider such requests on a case by case basis, taking into consideration issues of security, operational priorities, consistency of the requested measure with its mandate and rules of engagement, as well as the capacity of the DRC authorities themselves to render the assistance sought. The enforcement powers of MONUC are thus made available at the request of the DRC Government, rather than that of the ICC.

Thanks to such a broad and robust cooperation agreement, the OTP was able to request MONUC’s cooperation regarding the transmission of various documents, as well as their assistance with the transportation and the security of suspects and witnesses. Additional forms of cooperation include the use of MONUC’s facilities in the field by OTP staff members, including IT facilities, work places, etc. The UN also agreed to take such steps as are within its powers to make available for interview members of MONUC whom there is good reason to believe have information that is likely assist an investigation and that cannot be reasonably obtained elsewhere. There are also provisions regarding testimony, and in fact the first witness to appear before the ICC is a former MONUC child protection officer.

Importantly, these forms of cooperation are also available to the Defence upon order of the Judges. In short, the MoU between the OTP and MONUC made all the compulsory powers of the mission available to the Office. Its provisions were consistent with MONUC’s mandate and the sovereignty of the DRC, and allowed the DRC authorities to fulfil their cooperation obligations towards the ICC.

Before I turn to the challenges and future possibilities, for the sake of completeness I would like to note that the ICC also has a cooperation agreement with the European Union. This agreement provides for certain forms of cooperation, mostly in Head Quarters, but also in the field.


IV. Challenges and future possibilities

The protection of confidential information

An issue which can have considerable impact on the provision of cooperation by peacekeepers and others is the assurance of confidentiality that the Prosecutor and the Court in general can offer to information providers. In many instances, without such guarantees, cooperation will simply not be forthcoming.

Clearly, since the Court is guided by principles of transparency and procedural fairness, the presumption is that information obtained during the course of an investigation will be gathered for its potential use as evidence in open court. There may be compelling circumstances, however, where an information provider, such as an intergovernmental organization or a peacekeeping mission, may fear that the disclosure of information it has provided could endanger the personal safety of staff or other individuals.

In certain circumstances, disclosure or even the fact that cooperation has been rendered could compromise the security and proper conduct of the operations and activities on the ground of the source. It may, moreover, violate a duty of confidentiality the information provider owes to a third party.

Accordingly, article 54(3)(e) of the ICC Statute, much like it predecessor Rule 70 under the ICTY/R RPE, grants the Prosecutor the power to accept documents or information, either in whole or in part, on the condition of confidentiality and subject to non-disclosure without the consent of the information provider. Materials so obtained are to be used solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, and therefore cannot be admitted before Chambers as evidence per se without the provider’s prior consent. Rule 82, also borrowing from ICTY/R Rule 70, deals with the situation where an information provider lifts the restrictions on materials that have been previously provided under article 54(3)(e). In order to instil confidence and to encourage cooperation from providers to assist in-court proceedings, the provision clarifies that the Chamber is barred from inquiring into the materials presented beyond the scope which the information provider has agreed to disclose.

Perhaps the most complex issue related to the promotion of cooperation under the promise of confidentiality is how this interest should be balanced vis-à-vis the rights of the accused and, in particular the duty of the Prosecutor to provide prompt disclosure of potentially exonerating information.

The Rome Statute is silent on where the balance lies. In the ad hoc tribunals, after considerable litigation and diverging jurisprudence, the matter was finally resolved by amendment of the Rules in July 2004 to clarify that Rule 68 (on exculpatory disclosure) is “subject to the provisions of Rule 70”; meaning that the duty of the prosecutor to disclose exonerating information cannot override an agreement on non-disclosure.

This amendment came too late to influence the drafting of the ICC’s Statute and Rules, thus the issue will have to be settled by the Chambers. It has already arisen in the context of the Lubanga case, our first trial, resulting in a stay in the proceedings.

The OTP with the Chambers are establishing procedures to respect the confidentiality required by information providers to protect the security of their staff and procedures to disclose all the relevant information to the defence. We are confident that we will harmonise the requirements for fair trials and the respect we owe to all those who are providing assistance to the Court: the witnesses, the victims, the NGOs and the United Nations. What is important is that the Court is building the foundations of an international criminal system for centuries, based on the highest standards.

The relationship between conflict resolution initiatives and justice

The cooperation between the ICC and peacekeeping operations is done on a case-by-case basis. The successful and robust agreement we reached with MONUC was the result of UN Member States and the DRC authorities agreeing to provide the Court with the manner and modalities for cooperation and judicial assistance in the DRC situation. In the Darfur situation, the UN/AU peacekeeping operation, UNAMID, does not have the mandate to assist us; it can also be inferred by the non-cooperation of the Government of Sudan that they would not accept cooperating with the Court in this sense. We have thus not asked UNAMID to assist us nor do we intend to.

As a result, there is still a discrepancy between the Court’s mandate and the enforcement of the mandate by States Parties and partners in the field. We can do more with States and multilateral institutions to find better solutions to arrest, to update and harmonize old conflict management strategies with the new reality created by the Rome Statute.

The drafters of the Rome Statute clearly recognized the intrinsic link between justice and peace. As stated in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, by putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes, the Court can contribute to the prevention of such crimes, thus having a deterrent effect.

We believe that international justice, national justice, the search for the truth and peace negotiations can and must work together; they are not alternative ways to achieve a goal; they can be integrated into one comprehensive solution.

Peace negotiations and operations must to respect our judicial mandate, just as we have to respect their independent mandates. Peace and justice can work together to bring real and sustainable peace.


Jurisdiction of the Court over crimes against peacekeepers

Since the 1990s, the issue of attacks on UN peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel has become the object of increased international concern. The adoption of the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel in 1994 was a milestone in this regard with its inclusion of criminalization of these attacks and the principle of prosecute or extradite.

Subsequent Security Council resolutions have repeatedly condemned attacks on UN and associated personnel and called on States to prosecute persons responsible for such attacks. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2000/4, in particular, “welcomes the inclusion [of such attacks] as a war crime in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”. Later statements and resolutions have called more generally on States to end impunity for such attacks.

Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute characterizes as war crimes attacks intentionally directed at “personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” provided that they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under IHL.

Given the exceptional serious gravity of such crimes and given the serious consequences they can have not only for the victims, but also for the international community, the OTP has agreed with commentators such as the International Law Commission concerning the gravity of such offences. We decided that the gravity criterion - which is one of the key factors which the OTP uses to decide in which of the many situations under our jurisdiction we will open an investigation - in relation to such attacks will be weighed in qualitative, and not only quantitative, terms.

As the Prosecutor indicated in his reports to the UN Security Council in December 2007 and June 2008, the OTP is currently investigating the 29 October 2007 attack on the AU Mission in Sudan Haskanita base, where 10 soldiers were killed, 8 injured and 1 unaccounted. Additionally, attacks on humanitarian convoys have a devastating effect, and the Prosecutor clearly indicated that such attacks or threats of attack on peacekeepers and aid personnel will be investigated by his Office.

V. Conclusion

I would like to note that in the end, the successful implementation of the Rome Statute provisions will require that all States Parties respect their obligations and ensure, as individual states and as members of international and regional organizations, that the judicial mandate of the Court is respected.
[1] The author thanks Rod Rastan and Antonia Pereira DeSousa for their invaluable help in preparing this speech.

The Applicability of IHL to Peace Operations - the Perspective of the United Nations

Colonel Ben Klappe, Saturday 6th September, Plenary Session on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Peace Operations.

The Perspective of the United Nations

Mr. Chair, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to be back in Sanremo. I had the pleasure of working with the military department organising the training in the law of armed conflict of officers from all over the world and it is a great pleasure to be back in Sanremo and contribute to this Round Table.

That reminds me of an example of the applicability of the principles of international humanitarian law to peacekeeping some fifteen years ago when UNPROFOR was deployed in the former Yugoslavia. At one point in time an armed patrol received sniper fire from a cottage up in the hills. There were UNPROFOR APCs and tanks there. The response to that sniper fire was a heavy response. The patrol fired 37 tank rounds into that small cottage, effectively destroying the cottage. So when the force Commander came to see the sergeant in control of that patrol the next day, he said, “Sergeant, you effectively destroyed that target there. You acted in self-defence, I’m sure, but why 37 rounds?” And she said, “sorry Sir, it’s all I had”.

So the issue of proportionality wasn’t made quite clear to the lady in charge of that tank patrol. Nevertheless, I will show a few pictures and try to explain the dilemmas and issues that come up when peacekeepers are deployed in the field. I also would like to tell a bit more about the training activities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and in particular the Integrated Training Service, as it is called.

So, we perhaps remember this picture (shows picture) from the early 90s where peacekeepers found, as they said, that the mandate “isn’t good enough and our hands are tied”; “the rules of engagement are not complying with the situation we find ourselves in.”

Well, times have changed and all United Nations Security Council resolutions these days maintain that typical phrase: “to protect civilians”; the authority of the peacekeeping force to protect civilians from the imminent threat of physical violence. Now, basically, that leaves it up to a commander – to a force commander, but also subordinate commanders – to determine when there is an imminent threat to civilians.

And how imminent is imminent? That is the next question a soldier on the ground should answer if he uses force other than self-defence. This was the situation in Haiti, in the streets of Port-au-Prince and Cité Soleil a few years ago. Peacekeepers do use force and are authorised to use force. But then the question is the Secretary-General’s Bulletin: is force in this situation for the soldier really relevant? If he qualifies it as an internal armed conflict, or he qualifies a situation as a situation of an armed conflict for the purposes of the bulletin, then the Bulletin says the principles of international humanitarian law as laid down in the Bulletin are applicable to the situation. So there is no question of whether it is an armed conflict or a non-armed conflict. The question here is whether these principles as laid down in the Bulletin – namely the distinction between civilians and combatants, the treatment of detainees, the treatment of civilians, the treatment of persons hors de combat (this is a limited sum-up in the bulletin) – as I would argue, apply at all times. So even if the threshold of an armed conflict is not met, the principles can be applied in any case. And these principles are also laid down in the standard operational procedures on the use of force. And in the rules of engagement you find a reflection of the international humanitarian law principles.

In a questionnaire filled out some time ago, UNIFIL soldiers were asked if they had ever heard of the Geneva Conventions or the laws of armed conflict. Fortunately 98% said “yes”. And even more fortunate, 86% said they would like to know more about it. But then, unfortunately: “did you receive adequate instruction from your national army on meaning and relevance of the Geneva Conventions?” 71% said “no”. The questionnaire continued and asked: “do you think the Geneva Conventions have any relevance in peacekeeping missions?”. 71% said “yes”. And then another good thing, I would say: “the last time you received military instruction on the Geneva Conventions?” 67% said “during my UNIFIL training” – the pre-deployment training. Then: “how would you rate your own understanding of the Geneva Conventions?” 65% said poor.

Now this is a questionnaire with soldiers who were deployed in a mission. But if you’d have asked “are you aware of your rules of engagement?”, 100% would’ve said yes, hopefully. If you’d have asked them “are you aware on the SOP on detention?”, 100% would’ve said “yes: detention, there is the SOP, I’ve been informed on the SOP.” So what I mean is, it’s not all the Geneva Conventions and law of armed conflict as it is called, it is the principles derived from the treaties and the conventions that are integrated in these instructions.

Let me remind you that IHL training and dissemination is first and foremost the responsibility of the member states - the High Contracting parties, as laid down in the various articles of the conventions.

What are the human rights and international humanitarian law rules where elements of these treaties and rights can possibly be applied? That is, during the monitoring and reporting of violations. They have a deterrent effect through their presence and they have the authority and the capacity to stop the abuses of human rights. And in doing so they maintain the credibility of the organisation.

So, as I said on the rules of engagement, I will give you the example of distinction, military necessity and proportionality. It is in the rules of engagement and is explained in the instruction part that every soldier carries with him .The prohibitions under the rules of engagement as laid down in the various annexes in the Bulletin are derived from international humanitarian law treaties and provisions.

So now to the Integrated Training Service. There’s a team of very well-experienced trainers: national trainers seconded by their government; civilian trainers; specialists in training, military and police trainers working with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for a number of years. Of thirty of them, a few are based in Brindisi as their forward operating base – their ‘executive branch’ of the Integrated Training Service. The rest is developing training materials, distributing training materials and peacekeeping materials to the various contributing countries. They conduct pre-deployment training; they send assessment companies to assess whether their troops are up to standard that includes also international humanitarian law standards and training. And this, of course, is a sensitive matter, because who is the UN to declare that a country is not up to speed with the training of their troops? Unfortunately with the re-hatting of operations of regional organisations that, according to the UN, were not up to standard they were not accepted with blue helmets. So the Peacekeeping Department and the Integrated Training Service have developed standard generic training modules and they are widely distributed and widely used for the dissemination and pre-deployment training of troops and they are also used for in-mission training. In all missions there’s a small skeleton staff of two to four that is assisting the troop contributing countries and the units to conduct in-mission training.

We spoke about the relevance of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, and the Integrated Training Service is currently developing a generic training package that will be mandatory for all pre-deployment training to support Security Council Resolution 1296 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Of other partners in training, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has developed a series of human rights training packages also used partly in pre-deployment training, and in in-mission training which contains also a module on international humanitarian law. Of the ICRC, you’ve heard the activities in the various missions. Of course there is the on-line training and e-learning organisation UNITAR, which has changed names now.

Training should be practical and should be – and still is – a command responsibility. Here is an example: you heard Mrs. Telalian this morning speaking on the sexual exploitation and abuse issue as an example of training material. It’s a poster distributed in the mission in Côte d’Ivoire. It clearly tries in very simple pictures to illustrate that sexual exploitation and abuse will result in repatriation, dismissal and in jail time. We’ve seen the problems of proving beyond reasonable doubt that these acts have happened of coming to a conviction. But the efforts are there.

Let me conclude with examples of practical training that could be conducted in the field. A situation like this leaves the 18 or 19 year old soldier with just a split second to decide: is it a hostile act or hostile intent? He should have these definitions clear in mind. A hostile act: an action that will threaten life or result in the physical disability of a person. That is a hostile act. Is it a hostile act or intent? Is it a preparatory action leading to a hostile act? The Secretary-General’s Bulletin flashes through his mind in that split second as well. Is it a combatant or a non-combatant? Does it make a difference for the solider? It is a threat whether it is a child, a woman or an adult?

Children are, I suppose, even more unpredictable and are an even higher threat to the soldier. So the basic response here is: “am I to fire, am I not to fire?” Ideally, you would have the same response from Nigerian soldiers and French soldiers. Ideally. But we’ve seen cases in missions in Liberia in the streets of Monrovia where a Nigerian soldier will grab a child’s ear and say “give me that weapon”, and he will comply. But at the same time, some countries will have as their standard response: one shot aimed at he heart, and one at the head. It depends on how countries are trained, their perception of the situation and their individual response. You cannot show him the picture and tell him: “this is the way you should respond.” It all depends on the situation the soldier finds himself in on the ground.

I would like to conclude here because you’ve already seen an excellent sum up of General Dahinden on the red line in training and I think that that is precisely what the UN and the ITS is trying to achieve.

Thank you very much for your attention.

IHL in Peace Operations: The Perspective of NATO

Séance Plénière
The Perspective of NATO

Dr. Baldwin de Vidts

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, dear participants,

It’s a real honour to me and a privilege to address the Round Table concerning this topic which is an important issue for NATO. With regard to the responsibility to educate and train the military forces, participating in a NATO-led operation with regard to international humanitarian law, I’d like first of all to refer to the introductory remarks made by the NATO Secretary General, Ambassador Bisogniero, and in particular his observation about the role NATO nations have to play with regard to the education and the training of military forces. As a matter of principle, NATO-led operations will be conducted in full respect of international law including appropriate international humanitarian law and generally recognised human rights principles. NATO-led operations are conducted based on common rules and practices which govern such an operation and which are approved by the competent civil and military authorities within NATO under the global direction and control of the highest body within NATO which is North Atlantic Council.

Among those rules figure the application of international humanitarian law. Hence, whatever nation, NATO or non-NATO member state, that contributes forces to a NATO-led operation signs up to those common rules and must do at least the minimum common standard of applicable international humanitarian law. That minimum level is a result of the factual and the legal situation that not all NATO nations are parties to the same humanitarian law treaties. In practice this difference is, however, overcome since several main principles that lie behind the overall purpose of international humanitarian law are not contested: I recall the principle of military necessity, the need for distinction between combatants and non-combatants, proportionality, the principle of humanity, etcetera.

In addition, concerning that the military force required to operate and implement the NATO led operation results from the contribution of those states willing to contribute certain forces and military assets, it is within NATO that standing principle that each of the contributing nations is responsible for the education and training of its military personnel. The advantage of such a system is obvious: each nation is fully acquainted with its international legal obligations it has signed up to and is therefore obliged to take all the necessary measures for adequately informing and training their own military force. Therefore training and education in international humanitarian law is first and foremost the national obligation of the NATO member states.

Within NATO and in order to be properly prepared for a common operation and a unified NATO command and control that is comprised of the military forces of different states both NATO and non-NATO member states agree on the minimum standards of training in international humanitarian law. Not only to fulfill their legal obligations under international humanitarian legal instruments to which they are party, but also to ensure that the NATO-led operation can and will be conducted in accordance with IHL. In the NATO standing arrangements – and General Dahinden has already referred to the so called NATO standardization agreements – the following instructions and training principles are to be applied. First, all military personnel are to be trained regularly in IHL. In the event of a NATO-led operation, military forces made available to NATO should conduct such training prior to its participation in the operation.

With regard to that structure, before the non-NATO state can participate in a NATO-led operation under unified NATO command and control, participation and financial agreements must be concluded and also SACEUR – the Supreme Commander of Europe – has to certify and to offer a certificate that indeed these forces are able to take up the job.

One of the possible matters involving the application of international humanitarian law should be incorporated in military exercises. Although the basic knowledge of IHL should be common to all ranks within the military, higher knowledge is required for non-commissioned officers and officers in addition to such general basic level.

Since the overall object of training is to ensure in all circumstances an appropriate knowledge of and adherence to international humanitarian law, the training objectives under the standing NATO arrangements are: to provide all military personnel with a sufficient knowledge of IHL in order to enable them to apply IHL properly; to provide all military personnel with the appropriate training related to the implementation of IHL; ensure the simulation of conflict sits during exercises; to enable commanders to properly address and solve problems inherent to the application of IHL and make decisions accordingly; and finally to enable officers and commanders more precisely to take into account IHL limitations and precautions during the planning, the preparation, the conduct and the control of operations within the NATO framework.

Within the NATO context, several institutions exist which to a certain extent assist the NATO member states, but also partners, to provide and prepare for such training in IHL. Training courses at different levels are available at the NATO school at Oberammergau and at the NATO defence college in Rome. And, as it was mentioned during the opening ceremony, we are very pleased within NATO that an agreement was concluded – a memorandum of understanding – between the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in Sanremo and NATO school and we are hoping that a comparable agreement will also be signed with the NATO defence college. So, further, several training facilities established to better prepare the military from the NATO member states to participate in common NATO-led operations give also attention to all the different aspects of international humanitarian law, other treaties and also human rights law, and also in their respective training that is reflected. In addition and in order to conclude, NATO conducts a number of military exercises ranging from seminars to live exercises which incorporate concepts and issues involving the practical application of international humanitarian law.

Transcript done from audio recording by Amy Iberg - IIHL Genève.