vendredi 12 septembre 2008

Report of Working Group 3

Report of Working Group Three – Friday September 5th 2008.

Peace Operations and the Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law

Report presented by Professor Fausto Pocar


Thank you.

Working Group Three was composed of myself, Judge Meron who spoke of the role of peacekeepers in searching for persons charged with War Crimes, Ms. Olivia Swaak-Goldman who dealt with cooperation between peace forces and the International Criminal Court, and Prof William Taft who dealt with preventing and reporting violations of international humanitarian law.

The working group came to no final solution on these issues. It was not the task of the session to come to a solution but thanks the excellent and focused presentations there has been an identification of the major issues concerning cooperation with international courts and peacekeeping forces. Attention has been placed on both the achievements and the shortcomings and the limits of the varying and multi-faceted normative framework defined by ad hoc Security Council resolutions, fundamental international law principles and various forms of agreements. Also discussed was the influence of major political factors which tend to impact on the ability of courts to carry out their mandates, even though at times, as in the case of the self-referral of the Congo to the ICC, they may play in favour of courts as well.

A preliminary consideration that was made during the Working Group is that international courts lack their own police; they have jurisdiction over crimes but do not have enforcement jurisdiction. The contributions highlighted how, in addition to the non-replaceable cooperation of states, this limitation can at least in part, though with varying degrees of effective cooperation from one court to another, be remedied by the role of peacekeepers to a certain extent. But in general this will depend first and foremost on the content of the mandate of peacekeeping forces. I will not make a summary of the three presentations that were made but will rather discuss some of the points that have been made.

First, the lack of enforcement jurisdiction of international criminal courts distinguishes these courts, starting with the ICTY in 1993, from the previous experience of Nuremberg and Tokyo where the tribunals acted in a situation of occupation and had a sort of enforcement jurisdiction where they had the possibility of ordering the arrest of individuals and to collect evidence and so on. The situation is different for current court except, perhaps, for the Kosovo panels which are by definition and by their mandate assisted by UNMIC police and also, perhaps, for the East Timor situation.

Now one question: why is it so difficult to arrest people? Normally it has been said that there is vagueness in the mandate of armed forces in that respect. It was stressed that in the beginning even the ICTY received very little cooperation from States and that was quite detrimental, but also from security forces starting with UNPROFOR. Things only started to change at the end of the nineties but the general practice seemed to be for peacekeeping forces: “we arrest people for whom tribunals have sent an arrest warrant only if we meet them or if we by chance come across them.”

Nevertheless it has been stressed that the achievement of arresting people by the ICTY shows a very good record and it is largely satisfactory: out of 161 accused, only two remain at large. These people are at a certain level but nevertheless in terms of numbers the achievement is important. On the other hand the incorporation of peacekeeping forces of arresting accused in other situations has also been important. It is enough to think of the arrest of the former Liberian president, Charles Taylor.

The problem is somewhat different for the ICC and most of the debate focused on the cooperation with the ICC. The ICC itself of course has no international enforcement agency and the role of peacekeepers has been stressed as being very important. Also because the ICC normally has to investigate in the middle of ongoing conflicts and has the problem of ensuring the protection, safety and wellbeing of victims and witnesses during the conflict unlike other tribunals that act after the conflict has concluded. So there is a need to rely on peacekeeping operations and the need to enter into specific agreements with international organisations to facilitate that cooperation.

The agreement between the ICC and the UN was discussed. In particular, in light of that a case study has been made by Ms Swaak-Goldman on the cooperation between the ICC and one of the peacekeeping operations, being MONUC, the operation in Congo. Based on a memorandum of understanding between the ICC and MONUC it has been stressed that although the Security Council authorized MONUC to cooperate with efforts to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice this does not necessarily include enforcement powers in this respect.

Under the memorandum of understanding, MONUC may agree to a request by the Democratic Republic of Congo Government in carrying out the arrest of the persons sought by the court. MONUC may assist the ICC in search and seizure operations, security, crime scenes, transportation of suspects security support – there is certain flexibility on a case-by-case basis. But the enforcement powers of MONUC are made available more at the request of the government of Congo than at the request of the ICC itself.

Some challenges for the ICC have also been stressed. The problem of balancing the rights of the accused and the duty of the prosecutor of prompt disclosure of information are issues not addressed specifically by the statute of the ICC itself.

Especially in the third presentation, it was stressed that not everything is international criminal justice and not everything has to be done by international criminal courts. The issue of reporting international humanitarian law violations for the purpose of taking steps different from the prosecution of the individual is also an important feature of the repression of violations of international humanitarian law with a view to also identifying different political situations, like the truth commissions or other means for dealing with a certain situation. And the question of the prevention of human rights violations which tends at times to be underestimated was also discussed at length during the Working Group with the view to identifying how peacekeeping forces can work in that direction.

This connection has also been stressed that there is an important role to be played by domestic jurisdictions: it is their primary responsibility to prevent and to repress violations of international humanitarian law. A number of problems have been raised in this respect including how far peacekeeping forces have the obligations to report or also to intervene to stop abuses if they see abuses being committed or on the point of being committed.

Then the discussion went again to the courts and to the question of the relationship between international and domestic courts: the principle of complementarity. The difficult issue of deciding when a court is unable or unwilling to take a case, in particular whether inability is just a technical inability or if it is a political inability as it appears to be the case in many situations.

I will conclude the report here. As you see there have been many issues discussed. In general the lack of sufficient clarity as to the role of peacekeeping forces in this matter has been stressed, although there have been several examples in which peacekeeping forces have played an important role. But the whole framework is not fully defined and should perhaps be defined in the future.

Thank you.

Transcribed from audio recording by Amy Iberg, IIHL, Genève

Tool or Taboo?: The Relevance of the Law of Occupation to Peace Operations

Dr. Marten Zwanenburg
Legal Adviser Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands

Trasnscript of audio recording from Plenary Session, Friday 5th September

"Tool or Taboo": The Substantial Relevance of the Law of Occupation to Peace Operations

Good morning everyone.

I’d like to make a few preliminary remarks before I start my presentation. First of all I’d like to thank the organisers of this Round Table for inviting me to this event. Secondly, I speak in a personal capacity.

The topic of my presentation is the substantial relevance of the law of occupation to peace operations and I have given it the title of “Tool or Taboo”.

I hope at the end of my presentation to be able to tell you whether I think the law of occupation is a tool or a taboo for peace operations.

As I said, the subtitle of my presentation as given to me by the organisers of the Round Table is the “substantial relevance of the law of occupation” and you might already think that this means that I have concluded that the relevance is substantial. That’s not quite the case yet at least, so I perhaps should say I’ll be talking about the substantive relevance of the law of occupation. That is, to what extent the law of occupation is relevant to the factual circumstances of peace operations.

So in distinction to the formal application of peace operations therefore I will not touch on that formal applicability. I will talk about situations where the law may be formally applicable, where it may not be and in many cases where it may be controversial.

In the time allotted to me there is no way I can be comprehensive. So I won’t be talking about a number of things. One of them, as I said, is the formal applicability of the law of occupation to peace operations. Another will be the relationship between the law of occupation and human rights, as interesting as it is. And a third one that I will touch on a little bit but not comprehensively is the relationship between Security Council Resolutions and the law of occupation.

First I will say a little bit about what I understand by peace operations. Then I will give a very brief introduction to the law of occupation and then I’ll move to the substantive relevance and will finish with a conclusion.

Now, if you talk about peace operations you should know what you mean precisely by peace operations. the difficulty with peace operations is that there are many terms that are used – peace operations, peace-support operations, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement—and I could go on for half an hour more.

But there are very few clear definitions and the reason is that peace operations is something that has developed in a very ad hoc way, as we heard yesterday by the United Nations, and therefore there are no clear, hard and fast legal definitions. The definition that I will use is the definition used by NATO for peace support operations which you can see up on the screen.

And the central element of that definition is the word impartially which, at least for NATO, distinguishes between ‘peace support operations’ and ‘war-fighting operations’. And I should say at the outset that it is very difficult to make the distinction between one and the other in certain situations. I should also say that this definition of peace operations is still quite comprehensive dealing both with UN commanded operations and UN authorised operations, and even operations that are not authorised by the UN. Think for example of the operation in Albania without UN mandate authorisation but with consent by Albania. And finally about peace operations I should say that I will distinguish between what I call international territorial administrations, which are operations that take over partially or totally the administration and government of the particular territory, and what I will call ‘regular operations.’ Basically just like civilians are all persons who are not combatants, I will use this term of ‘regular operations’ for any operation which fits this definition and is not an international territorial administration.

The key question is: what does the law of occupation have to offer these operations? We heard yesterday that military commanders want clear guidelines about what to do and, more importantly, what not to do on the ground. Can the law of occupation provide clearer guidelines for military commanders? If you look at the law of occupation and its development, the picture doesn’t look too hopeful.

After all the law of occupation is very old and the very definition of the law of occupation has mainly been the same since 2 centuries ago in the Brussels Declaration of 1864. Essentially the definition hasn’t changed much since then. So, at first sight it doesn’t look to hopeful that a law that old could provide useful guidelines for modern situations.

Here is a very brief outline of the law of occupation: As you’ve all heard, the definition of the law of occupation is in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and then, of course, we have the Fourth Geneva Convention which also provides important rules on the law of occupation. Basically the Hague Regulations tried to balance between the interests of the occupier, the local population of the occupied territory and the displaced sovereigns, so there was something of a triangle there, whereas the Fourth Geneva Convention is more interested in the interests of the local population. There’s more of a real balance there between the interests of the occupier and of the occupied population.

And of course another important facet of the law of occupation is that it has both negative and positive obligations. Up on the screen you see perhaps the most important positive obligation which is art 43 of the Hague Regulations.

Art. 43: The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

As I said, I will not try to be comprehensive due to the time limitations so I will just try to cover some of the provisions of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention and see whether they can provide guidelines for peace operations. And of course it’s logical to start with the Hague Regulations and perhaps the main article is Article 43 of those Hague Regulations. Basically it has two elements – a positive obligation for the occupier to do something and the second part is a negative obligation for the occupier to abstain from doing something, namely to change the laws of the occupied territory unless absolutely prevented from doing so.

The first part for regular peace operations will usually be logical in the sense that very often to restore public order will be included in the mandate. My military colleagues like to use the term ‘a safe and secure environment’ and I think that pretty much covers the obligation in art 43. I think that for regular peace operations they will not be interested in changing the laws of the occupied territory so it’s not such a question for them. If we look at international territorial administrations, on the other hand, that is precisely the reverse. It may be difficult for them to abide by the obligation not to change the laws of the occupied territory unless absolutely prevented. And of course there is some leeway provided in the law of occupation as it has developed in doctrine also, in that the occupier can change the laws – it is generally accepted – if that is necessary to respect human rights; la vie publique can be interpreted quite extensively. But there is at some point a cutoff line beyond which an occupying power cannot go and beyond which international territorial administrations sometimes do go and certainly want to go. So on the one hand Article 43 may provide useful guidelines, but it can also provide strictures. This is where UN Security Council resolutions come in because it is my view that the Security Council can set aside the law of occupation. This is precisely where it could do so, in providing that an occupying power or international territorial administration admin can go beyond the obligation to respect the laws in force as much as possible – with one caveat that is that the Security Council should do so clearly and unequivocally, which I know is quite a lot to ask from the SC. But I think that if you send military personnel and arms away in a peace operation, that’s the least you can do for them and I think the Security Council could do better.

Moving on to other provisions in the Hague Regulations, for example Article 48 and Article 49 which deal with things that the government would normally do. These can provide useful guidelines for international territorial administrations which could help in developing regulations and instructions by international territorial administrations. I also think that when it comes to property – and of course the law of occupation generally makes a distinction between private property and property of the state whereby private property has a higher level of protection than property of the state – I think that when it comes to the taking and using of property that there the law of occupation has very useful guidelines for military commanders. You could think of situations in which they could be useful to use land by a peace operation for building of a compound which usually will not be res nullius but will be somebody’s land. You could also think of seizing weapons at a checkpoint –a particular weapon that you seize and perhaps destroy will be someone’s property. And there I think that the laws of occupation and the Hague Regulations have useful provisions that could provide guidance. I’m thinking of Articles 47, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56.

In closing on that particular aspect I think that it’s very important for the legitimacy – and I think legitimacy is a key aspect of peace operations – to be seen to be dealing responsibly with property. So therefore I think it’s very helpful that the law of occupation has some guidelines to provide there.

Moving on to the Fourth Geneva Convention. As I said, the Fourth Geneva Convention deals to a large extent with the interests of the occupied population. And a large part of that part of Fourth Geneva Convention deals with the physical protection of the local population, in particular Part Three Section One which deals with the status and treatment of protected persons. And also there are very useful guidelines to be taken from the law of occupation. Think for example of article 27, art 31 and Art 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

I’d just like to note that particularly in modern peace operations, which are comprehensive peace operations, and have many functions. Think of MINURC for example, which also has quite a large number of personnel, they interact with the local population on a daily basis so it’s very important for military commanders to have guidelines on how to deal with that local population and all the different functions that a peace operation operates in.

I should note, however, that a number of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that deal with the protection of individuals are quite generally formulated and that also there are some ‘escape clauses’ if you will. Think for example Art 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which allows rights of communication to be limited and also Article 27. I think that here we run up to the interaction between human rights and international humanitarian law. And I always warn people who are very adamant in wanting to apply the law of occupation to peace operations that this also opens the argument to other people to say that the law of occupation applies as the lex specialis and that therefore human rights no longer apply. And of course we all know that the law of human rights as the law of peacetime provides much more guarantees than the law of occupation.

A very important part of dealing with individuals is detention in modern peace operations. We will have a presentation on the Copenhagen Process later on today which is an indication of how important detention and the potential lack of clarity on the rules of detention are for contributing nations in modern pops. And therefore I think it’s also helpful to point out that the law of occupation has something to contribute. Think for example of the Australians in East Timor in ITERFET who were quite engaged in detention, used a number of provisions from the law of occupation. (Whether they thought it was formally applicable or whether they applied it by analogy I will not touch on.) They found that the law of occupation provided useful guidelines, for example in Article 69, in dealing with detainees and how further to deal with them and bring them to justice. But not only that, the law of occupation also provides legal bases for detention. I don’t want to suggest that if the law of occupation doesn’t apply formally a peace operation can rely on those de jure, but we all know that ‘all necessary means’, those three little words, don’t provide much guidance for how to deal with detention in a peace operation. To put flesh on the bones of those three little words I think it’s very useful that the law of occupation has Article 68 and Article 78 and that those can be useful to further develop guidelines for military commanders in peace operations on detention. Linked to that is Article 45 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which deals with the transfer of detainees. I’d like to point out that this article has been used by analogy, at least by my own country, in helping to devise an agreement with the Afghan Government in handing over detainees in Afghanistan even though the official position is that there’s no occupation there.

Those provisions I think are very useful, mostly for regular peace operations, but there are also provisions that are more useful for international territorial administrations when it comes to the provision of public services by such operations. One of those is Article 50 the Fourth Geneva Convention but you could also think of article 55 and 56. In international territorial administrations the provision of such services is often part of a mandate. The operation takes over the Government of the country and therefore also the provision of public services.

This raises a number of questions to do with the mandate of the operation. The first one is what if the mandate is more limited than the law of occupation would require. If, in a particular case, it’s controversial whether the law of occupation applies should this lead to a broadening of the mandate or will it lead to a mission (…) whereby the local population expects the commander to do something that is not really allowed by the mandate but to win the hearts and mind he’s going to do it anyway. And I’ve seen that happen in practice quite a number of times.

What if the capabilities of the operation are more limited than what the law of occupation would require? In a number of provisions the law of occupation says the occupying power must do the maximum extent of its abilities, or words to the same effect. But there are also some obligations which are not so limited. And what if simply the operation doesn’t have the personnel? We know that usually the UN Security Council in UN operations puts a personnel cap on peace operations. So what if that personnel cap is too small when we look at obligations from the law of occupation.

And finally, what I find an interesting provision is article 47 of the GCIV which I think requires a lot more study. At first I think it seems to put a lot of limitations on what an international territorial administration can do because often it wants to get local institutions running as soon as possible. At first, this article seems to limit that possibility. But if you look more closely at the text and the background, the object and purpose and the travaux preparetoires of Article 47, you’ll see that what it deals with is not so much that you’re limited with changing things but that you’re limited in changing things that will deprive the local population of rights they have. So perhaps it’s not such a big limitation as it seems at first sight.

And this brings me to my conclusion, or rather conclusions. I think it will be clear by now that I think that the law of occupation is a tool for peace operations – one of the tools that can provide useful guidelines even if the law of occupation is not formally applicable or if its application is controversial. Which provisions will provide useful guidelines depends to a large extent on whether we’re dealing with an international territorial administration or ‘regular’ peace operations. At the same time, we shouldn’t expect too much from the law of occupation because it’s the smallest circle of protection, if you will, and even within the law of occupation there are possibilities for limitations. And so I think it’s very important to look further at how the law of human rights and the law of occupation interact. And then there are a number of important questions which deserve more study such as: if the law of occupation applies, what if the mandate is broader than the law of occupation? There I said that UN Security Council resolutions with the caveat, when they’re clearly formulated can help. And on the other side of the coin when the mandate is broader than occupation and should of course be the other way around.

And finally, a note on accountability. As I said, legitimacy is a central tenant of peacekeeping operations. Accountability is a very important part of that, and there unfortunately the law of occupation doesn’t have too much to offer. We all know that there’s a lack of mechanisms of to deal with potential violations of humanitarian law. Also, there we should have some expectation management of what we should expect from the law of occupation.

Thank you.


Transcribed from the audio by Amy Iberg, IIHL Genève.

samedi 6 septembre 2008

Peacekeeping Operations and the International Criminal Court - Presentation by Olivia Swaak-Goldman

Peacekeeping operations and the International Criminal Court[1]
Olivia Swaak-Goldman
Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court


I. Introduction

The achievements of the International Criminal Court in the past ten years have been remarkable. There are now 108 States Parties, the Judges have issued 12 arrest warrants, resulting in 4 individuals in custody. The Office of the Prosecutor has opened investigations in 4 situations: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Darfur in the Sudan, and the Central African Republic. The OTP is also monitoring situations across 3 continents, including Afghanistan, Georgia, Kenya, Cote d’Ivore, Colombia and Chad. However we believe that the next ten years will be even more interesting. The Rome Statute is an innovative legal design modelled to address the threats and challenges of the new century.

In Rome in 1998, participants (including civil society organizations and states with varying legal traditions) debated the creation of the Rome Statute from very different perspectives, but all shared the same sense that their efforts were not just an exercise in putting ideas on paper. They knew that the new legal design would profoundly impact the way international relations are governed. Accountability and the rule of law would be the framework.

Under the Rome Statute, substantive law has been codified into one detailed text. States have reaffirmed their duty to prosecute those accused of the most heinous crimes. An independent, impartial and permanent International Criminal Court has been established; and authority has been vested in the Court to intervene if States fail to carry out their own responsibility to conduct genuine proceedings, while at the same time providing an incentive to States to assert their own responsibilities in the cause of international justice.

The Rome Statute creates a global criminal justice system based on the interaction between States, a permanent International Criminal Court, international organizations and civil society institutions, a system of interaction based on the two key concepts of complementarity and cooperation.

Let me spend just a minute on the issue of cooperation. It is essential to understand that the ability of the ICC to rely on strong and effective forms of cooperation from all of its partners will be critical for the successful execution of its mandate. As the Court’s President, Mr. Philippe Kirsch, has noted, the Court has been established on two pillars: a judicial pillar, represented by the Court itself, and an enforcement pillar, which in turn belongs to the States Parties.

As you know, the Court does not rely on an international enforcement agency to implement its mandate and execute its judicial decisions. Therefore, the Court’s mandate needs to be implemented indirectly by all States Parties, which accepted our mandate and recognized a series of obligations towards international criminal justice.

In this regard, one could say that the enforcement of the Rome Statute is dependant on national support (including through international organizations), for all matters pertaining to, for example, the collection of evidence, the security of witnesses, the conduct of searches and seizures, the execution of arrest warrants, and the surrender of persons. In all of these crucial matters for the enforcement of the Court’s mandate, we rely on the cooperation of States Parties.

One of the most significant aspects of the ICC is that, given the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, we have to investigate in the middle of ongoing conflicts. We have to do so in accordance with Article 68 (1) of the Statute, protecting the safety and well being of victims and witnesses during the investigation. In order to carry out expeditious investigations and prosecutions of massive crimes in this context of violence, we have come to rely on the cooperation and the support of international agencies in the field, and in particular of peacekeeping operations. Given the exponential development of the number and the mandates of these missions all around the world, they have become crucial partners of the Court in some investigations, while respecting their own mandate.

For the rest of my time this afternoon I would first like to discuss the general cooperation framework as established in the Rome Statute and how it applied to the Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the United Nations. Then I would like to discuss the Memorandum of Understanding with MONUC as an example of how peacekeeping operations and the Court can work together, before turning to the challenges facing cooperation. Finally I would like to touch briefly on investigations concerning crimes against peacekeepers.

II. Part IX Cooperation and the ICC-UN Agreement

Part 9 of the ICC Statute establishes the basis for cooperation in that it lays out the obligations of States Parties to cooperate with the Court, while also allowing the Court to invite cooperation from non-State Parties and international organizations. Additionally, under Article 54 of the Statute the Prosecutor can enter into specific agreements with international organizations and others to facilitate cooperation.

The regime for cooperation established under Part 9 touches upon some of the most critical aspects of interaction between the Court and national authorities. What is interesting is that the Rome Statute, which is a treaty arising out of four years of negotiations between States, attempts to arrive at a unique balance between what has often been referred to as the ‘vertical’ regime of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ‘horizontal’ regime of inter-State mutual legal assistance.

One of the clearest places we can see this is in the provision stating that requests for cooperation by the Court are to be executed “in accordance with the relevant procedure under the law of the requested State and, unless prohibited by such law, in the manner specified in the request, including following any procedure outlined therein or permitting persons specified in the request to be present at and assist in the execution process”. This has obviously proved particularly relevant for the Office of the Prosecutor, since the ability of the Prosecutor to control the manner in which evidence is gathered will often prove critical for the effectiveness of the investigation.

Priority areas have been identified in support of our investigations and prosecutions. State Parties have been asked to put in place procedures for the screening of witnesses, especially in refugee communities. States Parties have also been asked to set up emergency procedures for issuing visas for threatened witnesses, and some States have agreed to establish a “hotline” ensuring speedy visa processing.

Other priority areas of cooperation include: public and diplomatic support; arrest and surrender; information regarding the identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items; protection of staff, victims and witnesses and preservation of evidence; facilitating voluntary appearance of witnesses; providing forensic expertise and examination of sites; service of documents and notification; operational support; and identification, tracing and freezing of assets.

For all these forms of cooperation, it is important to highlight that even though States Parties have a general obligation to cooperate with the Court (article 86), intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, are not obliged to do so (article 87.6). However, in many of the situations before the ICC, field missions of international organizations or peacekeeping operations may have unique access to a particular territory.

In order for the Office of the Prosecutor to seek the cooperation of these organizations and missions, as it falls outside of the regime established by Part 9, it needs to enter into a separate agreement. Thus, by voluntarily signing the ICC-UN Relationship Agreement on 4 October 2004, the UN accepted a general “obligation of cooperation and coordination” with the Court (article 3). Part III of the Agreement clearly established the general rules and obligations on cooperation and judicial assistance between the Court and the UN.



III. A case study of cooperation between the ICC and a peacekeeping operation: the MONUC MoU

A year later, on 8 November 2005, these general provisions would help to give shape to the Memorandum of Understanding between the ICC and the UN on cooperation from MONUC, the UN Mission in the DRC.

The experience of the ICTY with the NATO-led peace enforcement operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that the conclusion of such agreements will be particularly important where an international organisation is exercising military or law enforcement powers in the territory subject to the Prosecutor’s investigations.

In the case of MONUC, the mandate of the mission was specifically revised to enable the possibility for ICC cooperation. After lengthy discussions resulting in the deletion of explicit reference to the ICC, the Security Council adopted a provision in Resolution 1565 (2004) which authorises MONUC to “cooperate with efforts to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice, while working closely with the relevant agencies of the United Nations”.

As a result of compromise discussions, however, the provision was excluded from the categories of tasks in respect of which the use of force is permitted. Therefore, it cannot be relied upon for ICC requests that would require the exercise of enforcement powers.

The Memorandum of Understanding between the ICC and the UN on cooperation from MONUC arrived at a creative solution to this restriction by cross referencing other provisions of MONUC’s mandate where use of force is permitted. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1565, for example, authorises MONUC to use all means necessary under a broad heading enabling assistance to the DRC authorities in re-establishing confidence, discouraging violence, and deterring use of force threatening the “political process”, and to enable free movement of UN personnel. Also of relevance, paragraph 5(c) authorises use of force for the disarming of “foreign combatants”.

Moreover, Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003) “authorizes MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deems it within its capabilities, in North and South Kivu”. MONUC has implemented such provisions to assist the DRC authorities in the arrest and detention of combatants and militia leaders located in its areas of deployment. In a similar vein, the MONUC MoU provides that MONUC may agree to a request from the DRC Government in carrying out the arrest of persons sought by the Court in the areas where it is deployed, where this would be consistent with its mandate. Other enforcement powers made available under similar arrangements include MONUC’s preparedness to assist in search and seizure operations, the securing of crimes scenes, the transportation of suspects, security support, and emergency temporary refuge for ICC staff and witnesses.

At the same time, the MoU reserves ample flexibility for MONUC to consider such requests on a case by case basis, taking into consideration issues of security, operational priorities, consistency of the requested measure with its mandate and rules of engagement, as well as the capacity of the DRC authorities themselves to render the assistance sought. The enforcement powers of MONUC are thus made available at the request of the DRC Government, rather than that of the ICC.

Thanks to such a broad and robust cooperation agreement, the OTP was able to request MONUC’s cooperation regarding the transmission of various documents, as well as their assistance with the transportation and the security of suspects and witnesses. Additional forms of cooperation include the use of MONUC’s facilities in the field by OTP staff members, including IT facilities, work places, etc. The UN also agreed to take such steps as are within its powers to make available for interview members of MONUC whom there is good reason to believe have information that is likely assist an investigation and that cannot be reasonably obtained elsewhere. There are also provisions regarding testimony, and in fact the first witness to appear before the ICC is a former MONUC child protection officer.

Importantly, these forms of cooperation are also available to the Defence upon order of the Judges. In short, the MoU between the OTP and MONUC made all the compulsory powers of the mission available to the Office. Its provisions were consistent with MONUC’s mandate and the sovereignty of the DRC, and allowed the DRC authorities to fulfil their cooperation obligations towards the ICC.

Before I turn to the challenges and future possibilities, for the sake of completeness I would like to note that the ICC also has a cooperation agreement with the European Union. This agreement provides for certain forms of cooperation, mostly in Head Quarters, but also in the field.


IV. Challenges and future possibilities

The protection of confidential information

An issue which can have considerable impact on the provision of cooperation by peacekeepers and others is the assurance of confidentiality that the Prosecutor and the Court in general can offer to information providers. In many instances, without such guarantees, cooperation will simply not be forthcoming.

Clearly, since the Court is guided by principles of transparency and procedural fairness, the presumption is that information obtained during the course of an investigation will be gathered for its potential use as evidence in open court. There may be compelling circumstances, however, where an information provider, such as an intergovernmental organization or a peacekeeping mission, may fear that the disclosure of information it has provided could endanger the personal safety of staff or other individuals.

In certain circumstances, disclosure or even the fact that cooperation has been rendered could compromise the security and proper conduct of the operations and activities on the ground of the source. It may, moreover, violate a duty of confidentiality the information provider owes to a third party.

Accordingly, article 54(3)(e) of the ICC Statute, much like it predecessor Rule 70 under the ICTY/R RPE, grants the Prosecutor the power to accept documents or information, either in whole or in part, on the condition of confidentiality and subject to non-disclosure without the consent of the information provider. Materials so obtained are to be used solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, and therefore cannot be admitted before Chambers as evidence per se without the provider’s prior consent. Rule 82, also borrowing from ICTY/R Rule 70, deals with the situation where an information provider lifts the restrictions on materials that have been previously provided under article 54(3)(e). In order to instil confidence and to encourage cooperation from providers to assist in-court proceedings, the provision clarifies that the Chamber is barred from inquiring into the materials presented beyond the scope which the information provider has agreed to disclose.

Perhaps the most complex issue related to the promotion of cooperation under the promise of confidentiality is how this interest should be balanced vis-à-vis the rights of the accused and, in particular the duty of the Prosecutor to provide prompt disclosure of potentially exonerating information.

The Rome Statute is silent on where the balance lies. In the ad hoc tribunals, after considerable litigation and diverging jurisprudence, the matter was finally resolved by amendment of the Rules in July 2004 to clarify that Rule 68 (on exculpatory disclosure) is “subject to the provisions of Rule 70”; meaning that the duty of the prosecutor to disclose exonerating information cannot override an agreement on non-disclosure.

This amendment came too late to influence the drafting of the ICC’s Statute and Rules, thus the issue will have to be settled by the Chambers. It has already arisen in the context of the Lubanga case, our first trial, resulting in a stay in the proceedings.

The OTP with the Chambers are establishing procedures to respect the confidentiality required by information providers to protect the security of their staff and procedures to disclose all the relevant information to the defence. We are confident that we will harmonise the requirements for fair trials and the respect we owe to all those who are providing assistance to the Court: the witnesses, the victims, the NGOs and the United Nations. What is important is that the Court is building the foundations of an international criminal system for centuries, based on the highest standards.

The relationship between conflict resolution initiatives and justice

The cooperation between the ICC and peacekeeping operations is done on a case-by-case basis. The successful and robust agreement we reached with MONUC was the result of UN Member States and the DRC authorities agreeing to provide the Court with the manner and modalities for cooperation and judicial assistance in the DRC situation. In the Darfur situation, the UN/AU peacekeeping operation, UNAMID, does not have the mandate to assist us; it can also be inferred by the non-cooperation of the Government of Sudan that they would not accept cooperating with the Court in this sense. We have thus not asked UNAMID to assist us nor do we intend to.

As a result, there is still a discrepancy between the Court’s mandate and the enforcement of the mandate by States Parties and partners in the field. We can do more with States and multilateral institutions to find better solutions to arrest, to update and harmonize old conflict management strategies with the new reality created by the Rome Statute.

The drafters of the Rome Statute clearly recognized the intrinsic link between justice and peace. As stated in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, by putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes, the Court can contribute to the prevention of such crimes, thus having a deterrent effect.

We believe that international justice, national justice, the search for the truth and peace negotiations can and must work together; they are not alternative ways to achieve a goal; they can be integrated into one comprehensive solution.

Peace negotiations and operations must to respect our judicial mandate, just as we have to respect their independent mandates. Peace and justice can work together to bring real and sustainable peace.


Jurisdiction of the Court over crimes against peacekeepers

Since the 1990s, the issue of attacks on UN peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel has become the object of increased international concern. The adoption of the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel in 1994 was a milestone in this regard with its inclusion of criminalization of these attacks and the principle of prosecute or extradite.

Subsequent Security Council resolutions have repeatedly condemned attacks on UN and associated personnel and called on States to prosecute persons responsible for such attacks. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2000/4, in particular, “welcomes the inclusion [of such attacks] as a war crime in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”. Later statements and resolutions have called more generally on States to end impunity for such attacks.

Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute characterizes as war crimes attacks intentionally directed at “personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” provided that they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects under IHL.

Given the exceptional serious gravity of such crimes and given the serious consequences they can have not only for the victims, but also for the international community, the OTP has agreed with commentators such as the International Law Commission concerning the gravity of such offences. We decided that the gravity criterion - which is one of the key factors which the OTP uses to decide in which of the many situations under our jurisdiction we will open an investigation - in relation to such attacks will be weighed in qualitative, and not only quantitative, terms.

As the Prosecutor indicated in his reports to the UN Security Council in December 2007 and June 2008, the OTP is currently investigating the 29 October 2007 attack on the AU Mission in Sudan Haskanita base, where 10 soldiers were killed, 8 injured and 1 unaccounted. Additionally, attacks on humanitarian convoys have a devastating effect, and the Prosecutor clearly indicated that such attacks or threats of attack on peacekeepers and aid personnel will be investigated by his Office.

V. Conclusion

I would like to note that in the end, the successful implementation of the Rome Statute provisions will require that all States Parties respect their obligations and ensure, as individual states and as members of international and regional organizations, that the judicial mandate of the Court is respected.
[1] The author thanks Rod Rastan and Antonia Pereira DeSousa for their invaluable help in preparing this speech.

vendredi 5 septembre 2008

The Applicability of IHL to Peace Operations - the Perspective of the United Nations

Colonel Ben Klappe, Saturday 6th September, Plenary Session on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Peace Operations.

The Perspective of the United Nations

Mr. Chair, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to be back in Sanremo. I had the pleasure of working with the military department organising the training in the law of armed conflict of officers from all over the world and it is a great pleasure to be back in Sanremo and contribute to this Round Table.

That reminds me of an example of the applicability of the principles of international humanitarian law to peacekeeping some fifteen years ago when UNPROFOR was deployed in the former Yugoslavia. At one point in time an armed patrol received sniper fire from a cottage up in the hills. There were UNPROFOR APCs and tanks there. The response to that sniper fire was a heavy response. The patrol fired 37 tank rounds into that small cottage, effectively destroying the cottage. So when the force Commander came to see the sergeant in control of that patrol the next day, he said, “Sergeant, you effectively destroyed that target there. You acted in self-defence, I’m sure, but why 37 rounds?” And she said, “sorry Sir, it’s all I had”.

So the issue of proportionality wasn’t made quite clear to the lady in charge of that tank patrol. Nevertheless, I will show a few pictures and try to explain the dilemmas and issues that come up when peacekeepers are deployed in the field. I also would like to tell a bit more about the training activities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and in particular the Integrated Training Service, as it is called.

So, we perhaps remember this picture (shows picture) from the early 90s where peacekeepers found, as they said, that the mandate “isn’t good enough and our hands are tied”; “the rules of engagement are not complying with the situation we find ourselves in.”

Well, times have changed and all United Nations Security Council resolutions these days maintain that typical phrase: “to protect civilians”; the authority of the peacekeeping force to protect civilians from the imminent threat of physical violence. Now, basically, that leaves it up to a commander – to a force commander, but also subordinate commanders – to determine when there is an imminent threat to civilians.

And how imminent is imminent? That is the next question a soldier on the ground should answer if he uses force other than self-defence. This was the situation in Haiti, in the streets of Port-au-Prince and Cité Soleil a few years ago. Peacekeepers do use force and are authorised to use force. But then the question is the Secretary-General’s Bulletin: is force in this situation for the soldier really relevant? If he qualifies it as an internal armed conflict, or he qualifies a situation as a situation of an armed conflict for the purposes of the bulletin, then the Bulletin says the principles of international humanitarian law as laid down in the Bulletin are applicable to the situation. So there is no question of whether it is an armed conflict or a non-armed conflict. The question here is whether these principles as laid down in the Bulletin – namely the distinction between civilians and combatants, the treatment of detainees, the treatment of civilians, the treatment of persons hors de combat (this is a limited sum-up in the bulletin) – as I would argue, apply at all times. So even if the threshold of an armed conflict is not met, the principles can be applied in any case. And these principles are also laid down in the standard operational procedures on the use of force. And in the rules of engagement you find a reflection of the international humanitarian law principles.

In a questionnaire filled out some time ago, UNIFIL soldiers were asked if they had ever heard of the Geneva Conventions or the laws of armed conflict. Fortunately 98% said “yes”. And even more fortunate, 86% said they would like to know more about it. But then, unfortunately: “did you receive adequate instruction from your national army on meaning and relevance of the Geneva Conventions?” 71% said “no”. The questionnaire continued and asked: “do you think the Geneva Conventions have any relevance in peacekeeping missions?”. 71% said “yes”. And then another good thing, I would say: “the last time you received military instruction on the Geneva Conventions?” 67% said “during my UNIFIL training” – the pre-deployment training. Then: “how would you rate your own understanding of the Geneva Conventions?” 65% said poor.

Now this is a questionnaire with soldiers who were deployed in a mission. But if you’d have asked “are you aware of your rules of engagement?”, 100% would’ve said yes, hopefully. If you’d have asked them “are you aware on the SOP on detention?”, 100% would’ve said “yes: detention, there is the SOP, I’ve been informed on the SOP.” So what I mean is, it’s not all the Geneva Conventions and law of armed conflict as it is called, it is the principles derived from the treaties and the conventions that are integrated in these instructions.

Let me remind you that IHL training and dissemination is first and foremost the responsibility of the member states - the High Contracting parties, as laid down in the various articles of the conventions.

What are the human rights and international humanitarian law rules where elements of these treaties and rights can possibly be applied? That is, during the monitoring and reporting of violations. They have a deterrent effect through their presence and they have the authority and the capacity to stop the abuses of human rights. And in doing so they maintain the credibility of the organisation.

So, as I said on the rules of engagement, I will give you the example of distinction, military necessity and proportionality. It is in the rules of engagement and is explained in the instruction part that every soldier carries with him .The prohibitions under the rules of engagement as laid down in the various annexes in the Bulletin are derived from international humanitarian law treaties and provisions.

So now to the Integrated Training Service. There’s a team of very well-experienced trainers: national trainers seconded by their government; civilian trainers; specialists in training, military and police trainers working with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for a number of years. Of thirty of them, a few are based in Brindisi as their forward operating base – their ‘executive branch’ of the Integrated Training Service. The rest is developing training materials, distributing training materials and peacekeeping materials to the various contributing countries. They conduct pre-deployment training; they send assessment companies to assess whether their troops are up to standard that includes also international humanitarian law standards and training. And this, of course, is a sensitive matter, because who is the UN to declare that a country is not up to speed with the training of their troops? Unfortunately with the re-hatting of operations of regional organisations that, according to the UN, were not up to standard they were not accepted with blue helmets. So the Peacekeeping Department and the Integrated Training Service have developed standard generic training modules and they are widely distributed and widely used for the dissemination and pre-deployment training of troops and they are also used for in-mission training. In all missions there’s a small skeleton staff of two to four that is assisting the troop contributing countries and the units to conduct in-mission training.

We spoke about the relevance of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, and the Integrated Training Service is currently developing a generic training package that will be mandatory for all pre-deployment training to support Security Council Resolution 1296 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Of other partners in training, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has developed a series of human rights training packages also used partly in pre-deployment training, and in in-mission training which contains also a module on international humanitarian law. Of the ICRC, you’ve heard the activities in the various missions. Of course there is the on-line training and e-learning organisation UNITAR, which has changed names now.

Training should be practical and should be – and still is – a command responsibility. Here is an example: you heard Mrs. Telalian this morning speaking on the sexual exploitation and abuse issue as an example of training material. It’s a poster distributed in the mission in Côte d’Ivoire. It clearly tries in very simple pictures to illustrate that sexual exploitation and abuse will result in repatriation, dismissal and in jail time. We’ve seen the problems of proving beyond reasonable doubt that these acts have happened of coming to a conviction. But the efforts are there.

Let me conclude with examples of practical training that could be conducted in the field. A situation like this leaves the 18 or 19 year old soldier with just a split second to decide: is it a hostile act or hostile intent? He should have these definitions clear in mind. A hostile act: an action that will threaten life or result in the physical disability of a person. That is a hostile act. Is it a hostile act or intent? Is it a preparatory action leading to a hostile act? The Secretary-General’s Bulletin flashes through his mind in that split second as well. Is it a combatant or a non-combatant? Does it make a difference for the solider? It is a threat whether it is a child, a woman or an adult?

Children are, I suppose, even more unpredictable and are an even higher threat to the soldier. So the basic response here is: “am I to fire, am I not to fire?” Ideally, you would have the same response from Nigerian soldiers and French soldiers. Ideally. But we’ve seen cases in missions in Liberia in the streets of Monrovia where a Nigerian soldier will grab a child’s ear and say “give me that weapon”, and he will comply. But at the same time, some countries will have as their standard response: one shot aimed at he heart, and one at the head. It depends on how countries are trained, their perception of the situation and their individual response. You cannot show him the picture and tell him: “this is the way you should respond.” It all depends on the situation the soldier finds himself in on the ground.

I would like to conclude here because you’ve already seen an excellent sum up of General Dahinden on the red line in training and I think that that is precisely what the UN and the ITS is trying to achieve.

Thank you very much for your attention.

jeudi 4 septembre 2008

IHL in Peace Operations: The Perspective of NATO

Séance Plénière
The Perspective of NATO

Dr. Baldwin de Vidts

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, dear participants,

It’s a real honour to me and a privilege to address the Round Table concerning this topic which is an important issue for NATO. With regard to the responsibility to educate and train the military forces, participating in a NATO-led operation with regard to international humanitarian law, I’d like first of all to refer to the introductory remarks made by the NATO Secretary General, Ambassador Bisogniero, and in particular his observation about the role NATO nations have to play with regard to the education and the training of military forces. As a matter of principle, NATO-led operations will be conducted in full respect of international law including appropriate international humanitarian law and generally recognised human rights principles. NATO-led operations are conducted based on common rules and practices which govern such an operation and which are approved by the competent civil and military authorities within NATO under the global direction and control of the highest body within NATO which is North Atlantic Council.

Among those rules figure the application of international humanitarian law. Hence, whatever nation, NATO or non-NATO member state, that contributes forces to a NATO-led operation signs up to those common rules and must do at least the minimum common standard of applicable international humanitarian law. That minimum level is a result of the factual and the legal situation that not all NATO nations are parties to the same humanitarian law treaties. In practice this difference is, however, overcome since several main principles that lie behind the overall purpose of international humanitarian law are not contested: I recall the principle of military necessity, the need for distinction between combatants and non-combatants, proportionality, the principle of humanity, etcetera.

In addition, concerning that the military force required to operate and implement the NATO led operation results from the contribution of those states willing to contribute certain forces and military assets, it is within NATO that standing principle that each of the contributing nations is responsible for the education and training of its military personnel. The advantage of such a system is obvious: each nation is fully acquainted with its international legal obligations it has signed up to and is therefore obliged to take all the necessary measures for adequately informing and training their own military force. Therefore training and education in international humanitarian law is first and foremost the national obligation of the NATO member states.

Within NATO and in order to be properly prepared for a common operation and a unified NATO command and control that is comprised of the military forces of different states both NATO and non-NATO member states agree on the minimum standards of training in international humanitarian law. Not only to fulfill their legal obligations under international humanitarian legal instruments to which they are party, but also to ensure that the NATO-led operation can and will be conducted in accordance with IHL. In the NATO standing arrangements – and General Dahinden has already referred to the so called NATO standardization agreements – the following instructions and training principles are to be applied. First, all military personnel are to be trained regularly in IHL. In the event of a NATO-led operation, military forces made available to NATO should conduct such training prior to its participation in the operation.

With regard to that structure, before the non-NATO state can participate in a NATO-led operation under unified NATO command and control, participation and financial agreements must be concluded and also SACEUR – the Supreme Commander of Europe – has to certify and to offer a certificate that indeed these forces are able to take up the job.

One of the possible matters involving the application of international humanitarian law should be incorporated in military exercises. Although the basic knowledge of IHL should be common to all ranks within the military, higher knowledge is required for non-commissioned officers and officers in addition to such general basic level.

Since the overall object of training is to ensure in all circumstances an appropriate knowledge of and adherence to international humanitarian law, the training objectives under the standing NATO arrangements are: to provide all military personnel with a sufficient knowledge of IHL in order to enable them to apply IHL properly; to provide all military personnel with the appropriate training related to the implementation of IHL; ensure the simulation of conflict sits during exercises; to enable commanders to properly address and solve problems inherent to the application of IHL and make decisions accordingly; and finally to enable officers and commanders more precisely to take into account IHL limitations and precautions during the planning, the preparation, the conduct and the control of operations within the NATO framework.

Within the NATO context, several institutions exist which to a certain extent assist the NATO member states, but also partners, to provide and prepare for such training in IHL. Training courses at different levels are available at the NATO school at Oberammergau and at the NATO defence college in Rome. And, as it was mentioned during the opening ceremony, we are very pleased within NATO that an agreement was concluded – a memorandum of understanding – between the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in Sanremo and NATO school and we are hoping that a comparable agreement will also be signed with the NATO defence college. So, further, several training facilities established to better prepare the military from the NATO member states to participate in common NATO-led operations give also attention to all the different aspects of international humanitarian law, other treaties and also human rights law, and also in their respective training that is reflected. In addition and in order to conclude, NATO conducts a number of military exercises ranging from seminars to live exercises which incorporate concepts and issues involving the practical application of international humanitarian law.

Transcript done from audio recording by Amy Iberg - IIHL Genève.

dimanche 31 août 2008

Violations of IHL committed during peace operations and individual criminal responsibility

Mme. Maria TELALIAN : “Violations of IHL committed during peace operations and individual criminal responsibility”

Working Group 4 (transcribed from audio by Amy Iberg, IIHL Genève)


Thank you Madame Moderator,

And allow me to start by saying that the very academic and thorough analysis that was made earlier about the responsibility of the international organizations is also relevant to the question of the individual criminal responsibility which is a thing that has been developed through the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and also through the new ICC, the new permanent court.

However I would like to focus my presentation on more practical measures and mainly on what the United Nations are doing presently in order to confront this question of individual criminal responsibility. This being the case I will focus mainly on peace operations in the large sense with special attention of course to operations that are United Nations led operations and which are controlled by the United Nations itself.

Now with this introduction, I’d like to say that the previous analysis by Professor Klein allows us to agree that international organisations are responsible for wrongful acts of their organs much in the same way as States are. Of course the rules on international responsibility of international organisations have not yet been defined and there is a process going on in the United Nations right now in the context of the international commission, however I would feel safe to say that by analogy we can apply the rules of state responsibility also to international organisations. Now one of the consequences of the responsibility of international organisations and hence of the UN is the question of criminal reparation of violations of IHL committed by their agents within the context of peace operations. One should also envisage a joint responsibility for the same conduct of course between the UN and the states participating in the force if they both share the control over the said military operation. And here I agree with the analysis made earlier concerning the criteria of effective control which is a determinant factor in saying whether States in parallel with international organisations can exercise such control.


It is important to note, however, that whereas the UN as an international organisation will be certainly attributed the violations of international humanitarian law committed by its agents in the context of peace operations, the execution of the criminal reparation as a general rule should be guaranteed by states. This is understandable since as Dr. Shraga mentioned yesterday, the UN does not dispose the necessary legal and material capacity to this effect. This means that the UN can not hold the person accountable and does not have the legal capacity to conduct criminal investigations where it is alleged that the conduct engaged in by persons participating in UN operation may amount to a crime. The UN as the organisation that has the management and the responsibility for peacekeeping personnel can only conduct administrative investigations as part of the disciplinary process. Of course the organisation can not exercise executive powers as we call them, except if such executive mandate is given to it by the Security Council as is the case for instance in Timor l’Est and Kosovo where the Security Council explicitly gave the UN the capacity to exercise enforcement powers and prosecutorial powers. This being the case the exercise of criminal jurisdiction for criminal acts committed by peacekeepers at their duty station remains the responsibility of member states. As to which state is entitled to exercise such jurisdiction, the prevailing rule is that where the offender of the alleged criminal conduct is a national, and particularly a member of the security or armed forces of the state participating in the UN force, he will be exempt from the criminal jurisdiction of the state where the criminal act was committed and will be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending state. Only the latter can invest and prosecute that person either through ad hoc action of its judicial organs which are accompanying the force, or through action of its national tribunal situated on its territory. And of course if there is a referral to an international penal court. Likewise the sending state has also the ability to exercise law enforcement functions including arrest, search and seizure and conducting interviews for the said conduct. All the above rules regarding the exemption of criminal jurisdiction of the host state are clearly reflected in status of forces and status of nations agreements. Somas and sofas as the military call them

And according, of course, to these agreements the members of the military personnel of the force are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state of their nationality in conformity with the criminal laws and regulations of that state. It is important to note that these agreements – the SOFAs and SOMAs - also specify that the care to exercise jurisdiction rests with the authorities of the interested state including the military commander of the national contingents. It’s important also to note that these SOMAs and SOFAs are codified by the UN in a model status of forces agreement which was drafted upon the mandate of the General Assembly. However, not all the members of the peacekeeping force enjoy the same immunity. A distinction is made between the members of the military contingents who enjoy personal immunity – that is immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host state – for any kind of criminal act and regardless of the circumstances under which this act was committed, and the civilian personnel placed under the UN force by the sending state or the locally recruited personnel who enjoy functional immunity, which is immunity for crimes or offences that are committed by them in the exercise of their official duties. This category of civilians is also subject to different accountability regimes. The civilian personnel which is accompanying the force, according to art 47 of the Model Status of Forces Agreement, in case of allegations of criminal conduct the representative or the commander of the force shall conduct any necessary supplementary inquiry and then agree with the government whether or not criminal proceedings should be instituted.

A serious problem that can arise in respect of the absolute immunity of military personnel concerns the relationship between these rules of exemption and the obligations of third states to repress international crimes according to general law or international conventions such as the Geneva Conventions. Does absolute immunity mean that a third state that is entitled to exercise international criminal jurisdiction for a grave breech committed by a peacekeeper during a UN peace operation is prevented from doing so? In the absence of state practice in this matter it has been pointed out that the solution would be to give priority to the jurisdiction of the sending state. If the latter is not willing or is not in a position to exercise it then third states should come into the picture. This corresponds to the underlying idea for granting immunity which is to facilitate peacekeepers to effectively discharge their duties in the host country with the understanding, of course, that the sending state should effectively exercise jurisdiction over the alleged offenders. Any other solution would lead to a denial of justice and hence to impunity.

In practice, however, national courts have a very poor record when it comes to prosecution of war crimes or other crimes committed in armed conflict. This is due to legal or political reasons. For example, the sending state might not have extended its criminal jurisdiction to crimes committed by its nationals in a foreign country. Or the crime committed by the person might not have been characterised as serious crime by the laws of that country. Or the military courts might lack competence for crimes committed during peace times. One of the few cases where violations of international humanitarian law were prosecuted by national courts is Somalia, where members of the Belgian military troops were tried for allegedly committing such violations by the Military Court in Brussels. In the same case, Canada and Italy set up commissions of inquiry and initiated internal judicial procedures to investigate such allegations against their troops. In most of these cases, however, the individuals responsible for such conduct have either been acquitted, or the relevant tribunals have made a very doubtful interpretation of the applicability of international humanitarian law in peace keeping operations. Likewise states are reluctant for political reasons to prosecute the members of their security or armed forces. There are regimes, for example, that prefer reconciliation or amnesty despite the dubious validity under international law of these actions. And, of course, they prefer not to prosecute. In addition, although domestic statutes may permit prosecution of non-nationals for crimes committed abroad, there is little political incentive for such action and in practice I would say it is rare.

Problems also exist in relation to functional immunity and in practice it is quite unclear as to the meaning of the term ‘during the course of their duties’. As an example I would like to quote that in the case of Kosovo for instance, it was declared that a peacekeeper who committed rape was not permitted to have immunity any more and the immunity, of course, was lifted. On the other hand in a case of murder that involves the UN mission in Kosovo again, the suspect’s immunity was waived although there was no reason to waive it as he did not enjoy immunity for that special activity. Another problem with immunities is when the United Nations are not simply present in a territory but they have an executive mandate and they’re acting with governmental powers. In these cases, granting immunity to UN is severely criticised as governments do not have impunity but, on the contrary, should be capable of being called into account. These questions became more pressing in the last few years when disturbing revelations concerning incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by the UN peacekeepers came into the light, seriously damaging the reputation of the peacekeepers and the UN as a whole. Then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, acknowledged publicly that acts of gross misconduct had been committed by personnel serving in a UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Disturbingly enough these revelations came a year after the Secretary-General’s bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse and the ‘zero tolerance’ policy of the organisations was issued. This ‘zero tolerance’ policy was reflected also in a set of standards which are contained in the bulletin that defined the behaviour required of the military personnel of national contingents as well as of UN officials, experts on mission, consultants, military observers and volunteers. The report of the special advisor to the Secretary-General on sexual exploitation and abuse by the UN peacekeeping personnel, known as the “Z Report”, which was issued subsequently, sheds light on the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel and noted, among other things, that holding the UN staff and experts on mission accountable for crimes committed during peace operations was problematic. This latter point was considered as requiring further consideration and the General Assembly recommended that a group of legal experts be appointed to undertake this task. The group of legal experts focused its report on the question of assuring the accountability of UN personnel and experts on mission with respect to criminal acts committed in peacekeeping operations and made a number of useful recommendations designed to overcome obstacles that exist in holding such personnel accountable for crimes committed during peacekeeping operations.

It is clear that ratione personae this report does not concern the military contingents of the member state but concerns only the UN staff and experts on mission. It should be clarified that experts on mission include UN military observers, police and civilians and others who are afforded the status of an expert on mission. These individuals enjoy functional immunity and of course the immunity can be waived under certain circumstances. One of the principal reasons for distinction between military observers and military members of national contingents is the relationship between such persons and the UN. Military observers are military officers assigned by the UN to perform missions and tasks of the UN. Although nominated by their governments following a request by the Secretary-General, they serve the United Nations in their personal capacity and not as a representative of their state. This explains the different accountability regime that this group is subject to. The basic premise of the report of the legal experts is that if a crime is committed in a host state where the peace operation is deployed and that state is unable to prosecute an alleged offender there is a need for third states to do so. However, if other states have not extended the operation of the criminal laws to apply to crimes committed in a host state, then there is a jurisdictional gap and the alleged offender is likely to escape prosecution.

In order to close these jurisdictional gaps, it was suggested that as many states as possible assert and exercise criminal jurisdiction over these kind of offences. The group also recommended the development of a new international instrument – a convention – that would enable states to establish jurisdiction in as wide circumstances as possible and provide legal certainty as regards both the personnel that is covered for the exercise of such jurisdiction and the crimes that come under its scope. The convention would also deal with questions of investigation, arrest, prosecution and extradition of offenders and mutual assistance. Such a convention, as was already emphasized by the Group, would only cover UN officials and experts on mission and would not detract from the applicable immunity regulations which either the UN or any of its officials and experts on mission enjoy. It should be stressed that although the Group’s report focuses on crimes such as sexual exploitation and abuse, because of the mandate of the Group, the Group itself was in favour of extending this convention or other measures to every serious crime committed in the territory of the host state including other serious crimes such as trafficking in human being, drug trafficking etc etc.

Following both developments, the General Assembly decided to set up an ad hoc committee on criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission to examine the report of the legal experts and its recommendations. This is, unfortunately, how the UN does work. It takes years and years until all the issues are thoroughly studied and eventually there is a decision made by the General Assembly. The ad hoc Committee has held some very interesting and thorough discussions on these issues and what is really obvious is that all Member States have emphasized their support for the ‘zero tolerance’ policy of the UN concerning criminal conduct committed by UN personnel and they reassured the need to ensure strict observance of the rule of law. It is interesting to note that many Member States have requested more detailed information from the Secretariat concerning the extent of the problem criminal activity by peacekeepers in order to determine whether there was a jurisdictional gap. Actually, they asked for statistics concerning serious violations of criminal laws. The answer of the UN Secretariat was that according to the information available from the office of internal oversight services and the dept of field support which is with the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) the problem is significant. These are the words used by the secretariat. Indeed according to statistics from January 2006 to December 2006 – one year only – from missions led by DPKO, a total of 439 allegations of misconduct, other than sexual exploitation and abuse were reported. At the same time, 357 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were reported for the same period of time. Of these allegations, only 176 allegations came from the UN mission in the DRC. The majority of Member States hold that statistics are not important in this regard and certainly they do not tell the whole story of sexual abuse and exploitation from peacekeepers. In this respect I would like to quote the words of Nicolas Michel, the then legal council of the Secretary General, before the 6th Committee of the General Assembly: “The UN Secretary does not and can not condone criminal conduct by its officials and experts on mission. Criminal conduct by UN personnel puts into question the core values of the secretariat and directly affects the world body’s activities and essential missions. Although it concerns a very small minority of UN personnel, the problem is significant.”

He also stressed that the failure to prosecute offenders by Member States brings about perceptions of impunity which can aggravate the situation. An important development in the ad hoc Committee is the elaboration of the text of a draft resolution of the GA which was eventually adopted by the latter last year –Resolution 62/63 which contains important short-term measures for states to enable them to confront the problem of the jurisdictional gap. Indeed in this Resolution the General Assembly urges states to establish, to the extent to which they have not done so, jurisdiction over criminal activity committed by their nationals serving with the UN. The Resolution also invited states to provide the Secretary-General by the deadline of 1st July 2008 – and I hope all the states have provided info – information on their jurisdictional competence as well as on mechanisms put in place for following up allegations of criminal conduct. These informations will be reflected in a report by the Secretary General and will clarify the nature and scope of the procedural and jurisdictional gaps and will facilitate the decisions to be made in the ad hoc Committee regarding also the advisability of the elaboration of special convention that will deal with the jurisdictional gap in this respect.

I know I have made an abuse of my time so I will wrap up by saying that the Security Council also adopted a resolution this year – Resolution 1820 – that addresses explicitly the question of sexual exploitation and sexual violence and also affirms that in the future we’ll reflect on taking sanctions on those who violate these standards. In conclusion, crimes committed by UN peacekeepers are very significant and they have serious impact on the psychological and the physical integrity of the victims, their families and the society as a whole. Such crimes also cast a dark cloud on the UN peacekeeping and damage the objective of the UN missions and the organisation as a whole. And the Secretariat, although it does not have the legal capacity to conduct criminal investigations, should improve its administrative investigative capacities because credible and reliable reports concerning the commission of serious crimes can trigger a criminal investigation by law enforcement authorities of a state that asserts jurisdiction. At the same time the organisation should continue its work on a comprehensive response – this is the word: comprehensive – to the problem of serious crimes and most particularly to the question of sexual violence by its peacekeepers. And of course we should mention here that it is a pressing and urgent need to ensure the compliance with international humanitarian law using the valuable assistance of the ICRC and other human rights organisations and also the Human Rights Council.

Thank you very much.

dimanche 24 août 2008

The Evolution of Peace Operations

Presentation made by Corinna Kuhl, Acting Chief of Best Practices Section, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations on Thursday September 4th.

The Evolution of Peace Operations

First, I wish to thank IIHL and ICRC for inviting DPKO to participate in this important discussion. I was asked to speak about the evolution of peace operations. While my remarks will naturally focus on UN-commanded peacekeeping, I would like to touch briefly on the larger universe of peace operations outlined this morning in the excellent keynote address by Dr. Kellenberger.

The term ‘peace operations’ obviously describes a very broad range of peace and security interventions in international conflict management. Many different actors are involved such as the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, NATO and other regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as multi-national forces and ‘coalitions of the willing’, which lack an institutional structure but are held together by usually one designated lead nation. In many conflict situations, there will be a combination of actors involved and operations take place either in succession, in parallel with separate mandates, or in some form of joint deployment under one mandate.

There are two points I would like to highlight. For one, the legitimacy of any peace operation is obviously based on its authorization by the UN Security Council. However, while the Council has the authority to intervene on issues of international peace and security under the UN Charter (and the legal basis will be discussed next), there is currently no global system of inter-locking capacities in place. Rather, what we are engaged in a patchwork of activities. We do not yet have – or may never have – a comprehensive international peace and security architecture that can task and implement the full range of intervention options from conflict prevention to peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. All types of current peace operations have to work around that gap.

Secondly, although you all know this well, I would like to emphasize the distinction between UN-authorized and UN-commanded operations, because they are often treated as the same. The difference is critical to questions of capability and accountability, and it plays a role in the various subjects covered by this Round Table. Since the UN entity I work for, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), is responsible only for UN-commanded deployments, the so-called blue helmets, I will use the term ‘UN peacekeeping’ in this way for the remainder for my remarks.

Let me then turn specifically to the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations. While there has not been a steady and irreversible progression of models and ideas towards the current state of UN peacekeeping, political realities have created an increasing variety of mandates over time, reflecting not only conditions on the ground but equally the global strategic context. Since 1948, the UN has launched 63 peacekeeping operations. Most of these closed because they completed their mandates, but several were terminated for other reasons.

As mentioned this morning, the majority of the 15 peacekeeping operations established before 1989 – the end of the Cold War – were based on an unarmed or lightly armed military observer presence to monitor ceasefires between countries, mostly in the Middle East. This is what is usually referred to as the traditional interposition model. With the end of the Cold War, this model gave way to more complex interventions with a mobile military force and a strong civilian component. The two superpowers were looking for ways to disengage from a series of proxy wars around the world, and it is for this reason that UN peacekeeping experienced a massive surge in the number, size and tasking of operations, from Guatemala and El Salvador to Namibia, Mozambique and Cambodia. These were based on wide-ranging peace agreements, adding new elements such as elections support to peacekeeping mandates.

With the early success of several of these operations came a perception that peacekeeping operations could be usefully deployed into a wide array of conflicts, including those where there was no peace to keep, such as Somalia, or where peace was extremely tenuous. The outcomes were often tragic. By the mid-1990s, the UN was coping with the aftermath of horrendous failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. The instrument of peacekeeping was widely discredited, and a period of retrenchment followed. However, the horrors of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia also made clear that inaction was not an option. Together with the lessons from the successes and failures of that decade, new thinking started to emerge around issues of international responsibility and the elements of an effective conflict intervention. In the absence of any other organization with the ability and reach to operate anywhere in the world, Member States turned their attention back to UN peacekeeping. Within a year, between June 1999 and July 2000, DPKO was mandated to launch five large-scale operations in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Congo, and Ethiopia/Eritrea.

Since then, UN peacekeeping has experienced an almost perpetual surge in activity. By 2006, there had been a 600 percent increase in the number of blue helmets. Today, DPKO leads 19 missions with almost 110,000 personnel and an annual budget of US$7 billion. The charts behind me provide an overview of all UN peacekeeping missions as well as a map of the missions currently deployed. (PowerPoint Chart)

And the number of mandated tasks has grown equally in size and complexity. The majority of today’s operations share three main features:

First and most striking is the shift towards “robust peacekeeping”. The turning point came with the mission in Sierra Leone, which started as a small observer mission in 1998. When armed groups mounted a major offensive in violation of the peace agreement, the Security Council agreed to reinforce the mission, not to withdraw as had happened in Rwanda. And not only did the mission grow from 50 unarmed observers to a force of over 17,000 troops, it was also given provisions in its mandate that it could act against hostile elements in defence of the mandate and, ‘within the limits of its capacity’, protect civilians under imminent threat of attack. That was a real turning point in UN peacekeeping, and the majority of operations since 2000 have included similar elements in their mandates. With these provisions came changes in the rules of engagement and force structure of our missions. Obviously, the consequences are part of the discussion at this Round Table, and I will return to this issue shortly.

Second is the multidimensional nature of missions. As mentioned this morning, peacekeeping has taken on an ever increasing number of peacebuilding and state-building functions, in the areas of governance, extension of state authority, rule of law, human rights, and policing all the way to exercising full executive, judicial and legislative authority in situations where we are asked to run transitional administrations. While multidimensional mandates were common already among the missions of the early 1990s, the range of activities expanded considerably in the past few years. Since no single actor has the capabilities to deliver on so many different activities, peacekeeping missions are meant to work closely with humanitarian and development partners. Within the UN System, the thinking moved from a coordinated to an integrated approach in the course of this decade, meaning all UN partners work towards a common strategic objective or desired end state in the conflict area. Under that vision, the early catalyst role of a peacekeeping mission would be naturally linked to long-term peacebuilding and development efforts. The structure merging these different strands of activity is the combining of the development and humanitarian coordination function in the person of the Deputy Special Representative of an integrated mission.

The third main feature is the interaction between UN peacekeeping and the other actors in peace operations. According to the Center on International Cooperation, about 40 out of 54 recent missions consisted of some form of joint, coordinated or sequenced operation by more than one institution. A good example for UN peacekeeping is the provision of short-term military support. Given the time it takes for the UN to generate troops, the Security Council will at times authorize one state or a multinational force to deploy quickly for an interim period while the UN mission builds up its strength. In other cases, a Member State, regional organization or multinational force will take on the military component of a Security Council mandate while DPKO deploys the civilian and police components.

These features reflect in a significant way the shift from the use of peacekeeping primarily in inter-state conflicts to its primary deployment into intra-state conflict where stabilization is no longer a matter of skillful diplomacy to control international aggression. Rather, stabilization requires transforming multiple political, economic, social and ethnic drivers of conflict so that all groups have a long-term stake in the peaceful settlement of disputes. In the earlier multidimensional mandates, the exit strategy was often the holding of elections and the swearing in of a new government. What we now have goes way beyond the conclusion of an electoral process. Now there is a continued focus on the viability of institutions to guarantee peace, based on respect for human rights, the rule of law and public participation.

The evolution I just described shows the flexibility of peacekeeping as a conflict management tool. However, this also brings us to the question of its limitations. The UN is easily seen as a ready provider of last resort – when no-one else is willing or able to go – and it is assigned problem-solving roles that it is ill equipped to handle. So the high number of mandates is not always an expression of popularity. Sometime it simply means that UN peacekeeping is the lowest common denominator on which all Security Council members can agree when a crisis hits and countries want to be seen as doing ‘something’. But peacekeeping is not an effective tool in every situation.

UN peacekeeping works primarily when it adheres to the three basic principles that have characterized it from the beginning: consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self defence and defence of the mandate.

Consent of the main parties to the conflict is key. It requires a commitment by the parties to a political process and their acceptance of the PKO mandated to support that process. The principle of consent ultimately recognizes the fact that peacekeeping is a political exercise and not simply a military or technocratic effort. However, understanding of that concept has evolved significantly from the early days. For one, we had to learn that consent is not given once and then taken for granted. It is something we have to work constantly to maintain and move the peace process forward. Of course, the impartiality and perceived legitimacy of the mission plays an important role in maintaining consent. Another aspect is that consent may have been given grudgingly under international pressure, and may be withdrawn in a variety of ways, including by restricting the mission’s freedom of movement or impounding its equipment. A third element is that in many conflicts, the parties are internally divided and have weak command structures, meaning that consent can break down at the local level or through the appearance of spoilers, even if the leadership in the capital is committed.

This discussion is, of course, closely linked to questions around the use of force by peacekeepers. I referred earlier to ‘robust peacekeeping’. It is widely agreed now that UN peacekeepers may use force at the tactical level if acting in self-defense or in defense of the mandate. Tactical level means force is used in support of a peace process, not in the absence of it; it seeks to protect civilians and deter spoilers, not to inflict military defeat; and it requires the consent of the host country and/or the main parties to the conflict. This is clearly distinct from peace enforcement, which is not based on the consent of the main parties to the conflict and may involve the use of force at the strategic level.

In several of our missions with so-called robust mandates and capabilities, such as in the DR Congo and Haiti, peacekeepers have mounted operations to deter armed groups or to restore public order. These UN peacekeepers have inflicted casualties. And we wrestle with the political, moral and operational dilemmas that arise in these situations, whether it involves curbing criminal violence in urban slums, controlling riots, deterring armed groups in remote, inaccessible locations, detaining and disarming suspects, and complying with IHL and human rights law in all manner of settings. We still lack a clear policy framework for ‘robust peacekeeping’ that accommodates the necessity to use force on occasion, but is supposed to do so without harming civilians, without using disproportionate force, and without turning our backs on people in need of protection.


Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to make five general points on the evolution of peacekeeping:

One, while the integrated mission model is now applied to most multi-dimensional mandates, it is not without challenges. The absence of a comprehensive peace and security architecture leaves peacekeeping operations as the main post-conflict vehicle to which a broad range of peacebuilding tasks can be attached. But the UN governance structure does not allow for a direct tasking by the Security Council of the specialized agencies, funds and programmes which play the key role in these longer-term activities. This, of course, affects implementation. Another challenge is the protection of humanitarian space which is inherently more difficult in an integrated model and remains a subject of debate.

Secondly, we should not assume that broad-based interventions are always the ideal. Some conflict situations are not ready for it. At times, even in internal conflict, it is better simply to maintain a buffer zone between adversaries and provide breathing space for the political process to unfold. We, as the international community, lack patience and expect solutions within a year or two. The diversity of peacekeeping models should not be seen as one being superior to another but rather provides us with more tailored solutions to different situations.

Third, and closely related, is the need to be mindful always about the structures we build under multidimensional mandates. We tend to work within one particular definition of the state and tailor state-building interventions accordingly. This is often associated with a Western model, and it has led to criticism of neo-colonialism, occupation and regime change taking place in the guise of peacekeeping.
Fourth, UN peacekeeping again faces a real watershed challenge with the deployment to Darfur and the planning for deployment in Somalia. Neither situation meets the basic criteria for effective UN peacekeeping. This is a dilemma no one has an answer for. The enormous suffering of people in these areas demands action but at the same time an ineffectual deployment will help no one. This discussion has taken on additional connotations in the context of the ‘responsibility to protect’. The backlash against RtoP has affected international consensus on the more modest concept of protection of civilians in a peacekeeping context, and it remains to be seen how this debate will play out in future deployments.

And finally, we are facing very serious overstretch, because of the rapid expansion of UN peacekeeping. The UN has not been able to generate the full force that was authorized for Darfur. Out of 30,000 uniformed personnel, only 9,000 have arrived since the establishment of the mission last year. Similar shortages exist among civilians, especially when it comes to state-building expertise. Headquarters support is equally inadequate. According to CIC, the US ratio of HQ staff to military personnel in the field is roughly 3:1, the NATO ratio is 1:4 and the UN ratio is 1:100. Among other consequences, this also means an inadequate management capacity. While it is not the sole cause, it certainly contributes to problems with conduct and discipline, even criminal behaviour, in some of our missions. With the complexity of mandates and the extremely volatile deployment areas, our capacity to mount and sustain operations is simply inadequate and could jeopardize the progress made in rendering peacekeeping more effective.

In the process of mandate expansion – in being the only available or politically palatable or most affordable instrument - UN peacekeeping is being asked to operate well beyond its traditional comfort zones. UN peacekeeping has transformed itself - several times over – in its sixty year lifespan, and no doubt it will continue to change. Our challenge is to ensure that further evolution in peace operations generally builds on learning our lessons about what has worked and what has not, and why. The tool we select to address an international pace and security problem needs to be the right one, or we run the risk of discrediting all international interventions.

Thank you.